Opinion

This is an appeal from a judgment on a cross-complaint, requiring appellant to indemnify respondent city for a judgment rendered in an action for personal injuries. We affirm.

In 1975 a man named Svorinich, employed by appellant, was injured while operating a forklift on a wharf owned by the city and then used by appellant. That action resulted in a substantial judgment in favor of Svorinich against the city, against which appellant was allowed a share for the workers’ compensation benefits paid to Svorinich. The city cross-complained against appellant, contending that, under the terms of appellant’s use of the wharf, it was obligated to hold the city harmless even for the city’s own negligence. The trial court agreed with the city and gave judgment in its favor from which appellant has appealed; we affirm.

Appellant is a regular user of the city’s wharf in its business of loading and unloading cargo. It has entered into an agreement with the city *982 expressly providing for the indemnity herein involved. The contentions here made are: (1) that the agreement between the city and appellant did not apply to the use of the wharf herein involved; (2) that the indemnity provision violated section 905 of the Longshoremens’ and Harbor Workers’ Act as amended in 1972 ( 33 U.S.C.A. § 905 ); and (3) that the indemnity provision also violates section 17 of the Shipping Act of 1916 ( 46 U.S.C.A. § 816 .) We reject all three contentions.

I

The wharf herein involved was assigned to another stevedore, but was used by appellant in this instance with the permission of the assignee and with the knowledge of the city. Appellant’s claim is that its agreement with the city applied only to the wharfs directly assigned to it. The trial court rejected that contention, as do we. The agreement between appellant and the city contained the following provision:

II

Section 905 of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Act, provides as follows:

Ill

Section 17 of the Shipping Act of 1916, provides as follows: “Every such carrier and every other person subject to this chapter shall establish, observe, and enforce just and reasonable regulations and practices relating to or connected with the receiving, handling, storing or delivering of property. Whenever the Commission finds that any such regulation or practice is unjust or unreasonable it may determine, prescribe, and order enforced a just and reasonable regulation or *984 practice.” Appellant cites, as authority for applying that section, American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., v. Federal Mar. Com’n (D.C.Cir. 1968) 389 F.2d 962 . However, that case dealt only with the validity of an order of the Federal Maritime Commission under section 17. However, as explained in Maryland Port Administration v. SS American Legend (D.Md. 1978) 453 F.Supp. 584, 592-593 , enforcement of that provision lies in the first instance with the commission and, absent a ruling by the commission, the validity of a clause such as this is not an issue that can be raised in a judicial proceeding such as this.

The judgment is affirmed.

McClosky, J., and Amerian, J., concurred.

A petition for a rehearing was denied September 1, 1982.