San Diego County Department of Social Services v. Claudia S.

Claudia S. (Claudia) appeals from an order sustaining a supplemental petition declaring her children Samkirtana S., Dove S., and David S. dependents of the juvenile court and placing them in foster care under the supervision of the department of social services (Welf. & Inst. Code, 1 §§ 300, subd. (a) & 387). Claudia contends that: (1) a written stipulation signed by her counsel to allow the referee to act as a temporary judge was invalid without her express agreement and therefore she was entitled to a review of the orders by a superior court judge; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support the court’s order of dependency; (3) the evidence is insufficient to *1479 support the disposition order placing the children outside the home in foster care. Finding no error, we affirm.

Procedural Background

On January 12, 1988, the San Diego County Department of Social Services (the Department) filed dependency petitions pursuant to section 300, subdivision (a) relating to Claudia’s children Samkirtana S. (Sam) born November 5, 1978, David, born December 3, 1986, and Dove, born October 23, 1985. The petition alleged that the mother used alcoholic beverages to excess, the father…

I concur in the result and in most of the discussion in the majority opinion. I write separately to emphasize that I do so under the compulsion of this court’s recent decision in In re Lamonica H. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 634 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 60 ]. Lamonica H. holds that a parent’s agreement to have a juvenile court proceeding tried by a lawyer acting as a temporary judge rather than a referee—thereby waiving the right to review by a superior court judge—may be inferred from the parent’s attorney’s conduct. If the attorney’s conduct can inferentially bind the client, I see no way we could conclude that the attorney’s execution of written stipulation would not similarly bind the client.

It is true Lamonica H. does not cite or discuss the more general authorities which address the question of the attorney’s ability to bind the client. (See, e.g., Blanton v. Womancare, Inc. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 396 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 151 , 696 P.2d 645 , 48 A.L.R.4th 109 ]; In re Marriage of Helsel (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 332 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 657 ].) The parent’s Blanton-based argument in this case, however, is necessarily premised on the requirement in California Rules of Court, rule 1416(a)(2) that the parent…