*1721 Opinion

Linda H. challenges a disposition order in a juvenile dependency matter involving her young son Joshua H. Infant Joshua suffered severe physical abuse at the hands of his mother’s boyfriend; the mother knew her boyfriend was abusing her son. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 1 § 300, subd. (e).) Based on these circumstances and pursuant to section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(5) and (c), the juvenile court declined to order any reunification services for the mother and set the matter for a permanency planning hearing under section 366.26. This court stayed the section 366.26 proceedings pending review. We will deny the mother’s writ petition and dismiss her appeal.

In the published portion of this opinion, we will discuss the parameters of section 300, subdivision (e). We will also hold that a parent need not personally abuse his or her child in order to be denied reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5).

Statement of Case and Facts

In February 1992, the Fresno County Department of Social Services (the department) initiated dependency proceedings concerning the minor Joshua H., who was then nine months old. In an amended petition, the department alleged the infant came within juvenile court jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (a), (e) and (g), as follows:

The minor was detained in out-of-home placement.

At the jurisdictional hearing, the mother submitted the matter on the social study, dated March 17, 1992, prepared by the department, from which the *1723 following statement of facts relating to the section 300, subdivision (e) allegation is taken. 2

Linda H. was a 17-year-old who until mid-January of 1992 lived in Texas with her son and her grandparents. She had had nothing to do with the baby’s father since before Joshua was born. In the fall of 1991 she met Ryan G., a 16-year-old from Fresno, who was staying with a relative in Texas at the request of his mother.

In January 1992, Ryan received his mother’s permission to not only return to Fresno but to bring Linda and the baby with him. The three arrived in Fresno in mid-January. Linda and Ryan settled in Clovis.

Almost immediately the baby began “getting on Ryan’s nerves” and the teenager was unable to control his emotions. Ryan would pick on the baby and become angry when Linda gave Joshua more attention. Eventually, Ryan started injuring the child. The situation became increasingly worse when Linda commenced school around the first of February.

On two occasions, Linda witnessed Ryan using his open hand against the baby’s forehead and pushing him, causing Joshua to fall. Another time she attempted to stop Ryan from hitting Joshua with a closed fist; the baby was nevertheless struck, which caused him to fall against the headboard of the bed. She further witnessed her boyfriend repeatedly push a walker, while Joshua was seated in it, with such force that the baby’s neck snapped backwards.

On February 3d, Linda took Joshua to a day-care center located on the campus of the high school she attended. A nurse at the center questioned Linda about bruises on Joshua’s forehead. The mother claimed Joshua had bumped his head against his crib or a wall. In fact, Ryan had caused the bruising by head-butting the baby. For the next several days the mother kept Joshua out of the day-care center and paid a sitter to watch him in an attempt to keep the center from reporting her to the authorities.

Around the 3d of February, Linda left Joshua with Ryan while she went out to play basketball. During this babysitting episode, Ryan placed Joshua on his back and used his closed fists to repeatedly punch the baby in the chest.

*1724 Ryan admitted to the police that on or about February 4th he slapped Joshua 9 to 10 times on the left side of the face, causing the baby to suffer a black eye.

On February 11, the day-care center apparently contacted child protective services. That day, according to social worker and police reports, Joshua had multiple bruises on his face and abdomen. Doctors at Valley Medical Center examined the minor and reported that, in addition to the bruising, Joshua had sustained eight rib fractures. They diagnosed Joshua as suffering from battered child syndrome.

Both Linda and Ryan were arrested and detained at juvenile hall.

Based upon a consideration of the social study, the juvenile court referee found counts a-1, a-2 and e-1 true, and thus determined that the minor was a person described in section 300, subdivisions (a) and (e).

At the dispositional hearing in May, the department recommended, pursuant to section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(5) and (c), that the juvenile court deny the mother reunification services and set the case for a permanency planning hearing under section 366.26. To this end, the department introduced evidence intended to establish: (1) The provision of reunification services would not prevent Joshua’s reabuse and (2) the absence of reunification services would not be detrimental because the child was not closely and positively attached to his mother. 3

Gordon Cappelletty, a clinical psychologist, interviewed the mother in early April to determine the feasibility of reuniting her with Joshua. He reported Linda had suffered a number of emotional traumas as a child, which made her very vulnerable emotionally and produced strong needs for attention and affection from others. “These needs manifested themselves in a clinging dependency on the male figures in her life.”

“When these needs are not met, which is likely to be much of the time, she will develop a great deal of anger, and resentment. . . . With or without the use of drugs, Ms. [H.j’s relationships are likely to be quite volatile and unstable. . . . Though she claimed in a very sincere manner that she was no longer interested in her former boyfriend, her sincerity at terminating the relationship with him is very questionable. At the least, she will probably *1725 enter into another relationship which is as violent as her previous relationship.

“. . . Ms. [H.]’s fear of being abandoned by her boyfriend over-rode her desire to protect her child.”

Nevertheless, the psychologist wrote in his report:

At the disposition hearing, Cappelletty testified about the importance of the mother’s motivation to change the circumstances of her life. If she lacked such motivation, no amount of treatment would be successful in helping her overcome the psychological problems which led her to allow Joshua’s abuse. If she were using drugs, it would greatly reduce the effect of counseling and call into question the degree of her motivation. It would also cause the psychologist to question her sincerity, since she had denied to him that she had used any drugs after becoming pregnant with Joshua. If the mother were using drugs, then Cappelletty believed it would be unlikely Joshua could return to her custody within a year’s time and not suffer further abuse.

The department introduced evidence that the mother was at least a chronic abuser of alcohol, marijuana and KJ (apparently an acronym for “killer joint” or a marijuana cigarette laced with phencyclidine [PCP]). There was also evidence that around the time the mother was interviewed by Dr. Cappelletty she had twice ingested PCP. Further, there was evidence the mother had told a counselor she was going to continue her relationship with Ryan.

*1726 At the conclusion of the hearing, the court announced it would not order reunification services for the mother. It determined the evidence was insufficient to establish either a close relationship between Joshua and his mother or a likelihood that she could sufficiently reunify with Joshua so as to protect him from future abuse. The court then ordered that a section 366.26 hearing be set for 120 days from the disposition hearing.

The mother filed a timely notice of appeal, challenging the jurisdictional finding as well as the dispositional orders. Her appellate counsel thereafter filed a petition for writ of mandate and a request for a stay of the permanency planning proceedings. This court granted the stay request, ordered the department to respond to the petition on the merits, and subsequently set the matter for an order to show cause. In the interim, this court has further stayed the filing of the opening brief in the mother’s appeal.

Discussion

I. Substantial Evidence

The mother argues there was insufficient evidence to support the section 300, subdivision (e) jurisdictional finding (subdivision (e) finding). She offers three alternative theories to support her contention, none of which has merit.

Section 300, subdivision (e) provides in pertinent part:

Under these provisions, therefore, the appropriate agency must establish the following elements in order to justify a subdivision (e) jurisdictional finding:

A. Whether the mother personally inflicted severe physical abuse.

The mother initially maintains there was no evidence she personally inflicted severe physical abuse upon her infant son. There is no dispute over this point. Whether she personally caused Joshua to suffer severe physical abuse was not raised by the department as an issue in this case; the department did not attempt to prove a section 300, subdivision (e) allegation based on the mother’s physical abuse of Joshua. Rather, the factual basis for the allegation in the petition was:

B. Whether the mother’s boyfriend inflicted severe physical abuse.

Second, mother contends there was insufficient evidence that the abuse inflicted by her boyfriend, Ryan, was severe. She concedes Joshua’s *1728 fractured ribs might be described, in general terms, as severe. Nevertheless, she argues this injury did not satisfy the statutory definition of severe physical abuse.

On review this court determines whether, viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, there is substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding. (In re Albert B. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 361, 375 [ 263 Cal.Rptr. 694 ].) All conflicts must be resolved in favor of the respondent, and we must indulge in all reasonable inferences which support the finding. (Ibid.)

As previously stated, section 300, subdivision (e) describes severe physical abuse as:

According to the mother, Joshua suffered the eight rib fractures as a result of a single act, and there was no evidence before the juvenile court that, if left untreated, these injuries would cause permanent physical disfigurement, disability or death. Thus, in her estimation the evidence did not prove severe physical abuse as defined in subdivision (e).

The flaw in the mother’s argument is that it ignores the alternate measure of severe physical abuse set out in section 300, subdivision (e); that is, “more than one act of physical abuse, each of which causes bleeding, deep bruising, significant external or internal swelling, bone fracture, or unconsciousness.” (§ 300, subd. (e).) In our view, there was evidence before the juvenile court at the dispositional hearing to satisfy this statutory standard.

Ryan admitted he lost his temper on one occasion and head-butted the left side of Joshua’s skull. This incredible brutality left marks and bruises on the baby’s forehead, as well as on the left side of his head. The act apparently occurred on or before February 3; the bruising was so severe that the mother did not take Joshua to the day-care center between the 3d and the 7th of February for fear someone would see the head bruises and report them to the *1729 authorities. Although there was no explicit medical testimony that the bruises were “deep,” the requisite severity may be inferred from the fact that the injuries were still apparent during the infant’s February 11th medical examination, at least eight days later.

On another occasion, this time on the 4th of February, Ryan slapped the baby nine or ten times on the left side of his face. As a result, Joshua suffered a black eye and a mark beneath it. As before, the evidence of bruising persisted; it was still visible 10 days later, according to a doctor’s report.

Finally, Ryan admitted he repeatedly used his closed fists to hit the infant in his chest and abdomen. It was apparently during this appalling, inhuman attack that the baby sustained the eight fractured ribs.

Thus, the record contains facts which, directly and circumstantially, support a conclusion that the mother’s boyfriend committed “more than one act of physical abuse” on the child, “each of which cause[d]” either “deep bruising” or “bone fracture.” There was therefore sufficient evidence to support a finding of severe physical abuse as defined in section 300, subdivision (e).

C. Whether the mother must be aware of the severity of the physical abuse

Mother’s last challenge to the subdivision (e) jurisdictional finding is the claim there was no evidence she was aware of the severity of the abuse which her boyfriend inflicted upon Joshua. Again, however, she ignores certain language in the statute.

When, as here, an infant suffers severe physical abuse at the hands of someone other than a parent, the minor is subject to juvenile court jurisdiction if the abuser was known by the parent and the parent knew or reasonably should have known that the abusive person “was physically abusing the minor.” (§ 300, subd. (e).) The subdivision does not require the parent’s actual or constructive knowledge that the minor in fact suffered severe physical abuse within the statutory definition. Indeed, several of the listed injuries, such as bleeding (internal), internal swelling, and bone fracture, may not be visible; they may be discovered only after medical examination or testing. We do not believe the Legislature intended to so limit the reach of the statute.

*1730 Given the mother’s admission that she knew Ryan was abusing Joshua, there was sufficient evidence in this regard to support the jurisdictional finding.

II. Section 361.5, Subdivision (b)(5)

Next, the mother complains the juvenile court erroneously refused her the benefit of reunification services. She offers a variety of arguments to support her claim. We find no error.

The juvenile court denied the mother reunification services based on the language of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5) and subdivision (c); these subdivisions provide:

A. “Because of the Conduct of That Parent”

The mother contends section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5) was inapplicable in her case and should not have been relied upon by the juvenile court, since the subdivision (e) jurisdictional finding was based not on her conduct but rather on the conduct of her boyfriend. According to the mother, the phrase “because of the conduct of that parent” in subdivision (b)(5) of section 361.5 limits the applicability of the subdivision to those situations where the parent is the person who actually inflicts the severe physical abuse on the child. Since this was indisputably not the case here, the mother asserts she was entitled to, and should have been afforded, reunification services. Alternatively, she claims the language of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5) is impermissibly vague.

Construing section 361.5 in its entirety, as we must (Moyer v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 144 , 514 P.2d 1224 ]), we do not find subdivision (b)(5) of the statute to be vague. Rather, we find it was properly applied to the mother in the circumstances disclosed by the record before the juvenile court.

Subdivision (c) of section 361.5 explains how the court should proceed if it makes an affirmative finding under subdivision (b)(5). (See In re Rebecca H. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 825, 843 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 185 ].) In such a case, the court may not order the provision of reunification services unless it finds:

Subdivision (c) also provides explicit guidance for the juvenile court in determining whether reunification is likely to prevent reabuse. In this connection, it says:

This provision in section 361.5, subdivision (c) confirms that the Legislature intended subdivision (b)(5) of section 361.5 to apply to the parent who, knowing the actual abuser, knows or reasonably should have known that the other person was physically mistreating the child, as well as to the parent who personally abuses his or her child. Were it otherwise, as the mother proposes, this particular statutory language would be meaningless, for there would be no reason for the court to consider whether the parent was currently living with a third person if the parent was the abuser.

Moreover, the phrase “because of the conduct of that parent” is not itself meaningless or inconsistent with our interpretation of subdivision (b)(5). 4 A minor may be subject to the juvenile court’s jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (e) because of the conduct of only one parent. It may well be that the minor’s other parent was in no way involved, either as the abuser or as one with the requisite knowledge of abuse by another. There is no reason in this type of situation to deny the other, or innocent, parent reunification services. The inclusion of the phrase “because of the conduct of that parent” suggests the Legislature was cognizant of the possibility of such a scenario when it identified in subdivision (b)(5) of section 361.5 one of those few situations when the juvenile court does not have to order reunification services.

We believe our construction of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5) gives effect to, and harmonizes, all parts of section 361.5 (Moyer v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 230 ), and carries out our obligation to interpret a statute, when reasonably possible, in such a manner as to render the enactment valid and constitutional rather than invalid and unconstitutional. (People v. Amor (1974) 12 Cal.3d 20, 30 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 765 , 523 P.2d 1173 ].)

For the reasons expressed, we find no basis for the mother’s assertion the juvenile court improperly applied section 361, subdivision (b)(5) to her or that the statute is unlawfiilly vague.

*1733 II. B.-E., III., IV. *

Disposition

The petition for writ of mandate is denied. The appeal from the disposition order is dismissed. The order granting a stay of the section 366.26 hearing is vacated; the stay of such hearing is dissolved.

Ardaiz, Acting P. J„ and Vartabedian, J., concurred.

AH statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

Because the mother’s claims on review do not relate to the section 300, subdivisions (a) and (g) allegations, the facts relating to these allegations are not discussed.

The mother does not contend Joshua was closely and positively attached to her. Thus, the evidence on this issue has not been summarized.

The mother argues that, if the Legislature intended subdivision (b)(5) to apply when the parent is the actual abuser as well as when the parent is not, this phrase would not have been inserted into the subdivision; a simple reference to section 300, subdivision (e) in section 361, subdivision (b)(5) would have sufficed.

See footnote, ante, page 1718.