People v. Smith
Opinion
035concurrenceinpart Opinion
Johnson, J.
I respectfully dissent from the majority as to the constitutionality of imposing a “three strikes” sentence on appellant. At the same time, I emphasize the three of us agree on the central problem. We only differ on the remedy.
The majority opinion joins in recognizing “the seeming injustice in classifying delinquency proceedings as something other than ‘criminal’ trials for purposes of determining the offender’s right to a jury trial while also permitting the resulting declaration of wardship to be used as a prior felony conviction for purposes of sentence enhancement if the juvenile reoffends.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1081.) In my colleagues’ view, however, the cure for this “seeming injustice” must come from the Legislature. In my view, the injustice rises to the level of a constitutional violation and, as such, can and must be remedied by the courts. As Thomas Jefferson wrote: “/ consider that trial by jury is the only anchor, ever yet imagined by man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its constitutiont." 1
The remainder of this dissent is devoted to explaining the alternative grounds for finding present California law violates the United States and…
lead Opinion
Perluss, J.
*1075 Opinion
Johnell Wyne Smith was convicted after a jury trial of residential burglary. The jury also found true the special allegation that Smith had suffered two prior juvenile adjudications for robberies committed when he was 16 years old. 1 Based on the jury’s findings, Smith was sentenced as a third strike offender to an aggregate term of 30 years to life in state prison.
Relying on Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [ 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 ] (Apprendi) and United States v. Tighe (9th Cir. 2001) 266 F.3d 1187 (Tighe), Smith’s sole contention on appeal is that it was unconstitutional to sentence him under California’s “Three Strikes” law based on his prior juvenile adjudications because he was denied the right to a jury trial in the juvenile court proceedings. 2 We believe Smith’s argument misapprehends Apprendi and Tighe and hold, as has Division Four of our court in People v. Bowden (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 387 [ 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 513 ] (Bowden), that a juvenile adjudication may be used as a strike to enhance an adult offender’s sentence notwithstanding the absence of the right to a jury trial in delinquency proceedings.