Pope
Pope v. Superior Court
Opinion
lead Opinion
Turner, J.
I. INTRODUCTION
We hold in this case that a city term limit law referring to an election to a four-year term does not mean appointment or election to a less than four-year term. Defendants, Malibu City Clerk Lisa Pope and the City of Malibu (the city), seek a writ of mandate directing the respondent court to vacate a February 3, 2006 judgment and writ of mandate. The February 3, 2006 judgment and writ of mandate ordered Ms. Pope and the city to not include Councilmember Sharon Barovsky’s name on a ballot for reelection to the city council. Because the city’s term limit law unambiguously allows Ms. Barovsky to run for reelection to the city council, we grant the petition and direct the respondent court to vacate its judgment and writ of mandate.
II. BACKGROUND
Malibu Ordinance No. 200 added former chapter 10.5, section 2.10.050 to the Malibu Municipal Code. 1 Former section 2.10.050 is now found in *874 chapter 2.08, section 2.08.040 of the Malibu Municipal Code. Malibu Municipal Code section 2.08.040 states: “No person shall be elected as a member of the city council for more than two four-year terms . . . .” (Italics added.) This term limit law was adopted by the city…
dissent Opinion
Mosk, J.
I believe the ordinance is ambiguous. It states, “No person shall be elected as a member of the city council for more than two four-year terms . . . .” (Malibu Mun. Code, § 2.08.040.)
The ordinance can be read to prohibit a person from being elected to three four-years terms—i.e., one four-year term more than the limit of the number of two four-year terms. On the other hand, the ordinance also can be interpreted reasonably to preclude a person from being elected for anything *878 more than the two four-year terms—i.e., the person cannot be elected for a 17-month term and two four-year terms because that would mean being elected for “more than two four-year terms.”
“A statute is regarded as ambiguous if it is capable of two constructions, both of which are reasonable.” (Hughes v. Board of Architectural Examiners (1998) 17 Cal.4th 763, 776 [ 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 624 , 952 P2d 641 ].) Accordingly, “it is appropriate to consider indicia of the voters’ intent other than the language of the provision itself.” (Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. State Bd. Of Equalization (1991) 53 Cal.3d 245, 250 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 325 , 806 P.2d 1360 ]; see People v. Rizo (2000) 22 Cal.4th 681, 685 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d…