Opinion

Brendan O. (maternal grandfather), maternal grandfather of Mickel O. and Mallory P. (collectively, the children), appeals the juvenile court’s denial of his petition, filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 388, requesting that the court place the children with the maternal grandparents (maternal grandparents) or, in the alternative, provide maternal grandparents unsupervised visitation with the children. In addition, maternal grandfather specifically contends (1) the social worker violated his constitutional rights by searching his personal belongings; (2) the social worker did not comply with the juvenile court’s mediation order; (3) the agency 1 and the juvenile court failed to investigate referrals made regarding abuse and neglect of the children while in the paternal grandparents’ (paternal grandparents) care; (4) the social worker did not properly investigate allegations of mistreatment of Mallory; (5) the juvenile court failed to protect Mallory and failed to enforce the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (Pen. Code, § 11164 et seq.); (6) the social worker’s report was biased and contained false information; (7) maternal grandparents should have been considered for adoptive placement; (8) the juvenile court erred when it granted de facto parent status to the paternal grandmother (paternal grandmother); (9) the children were denied effective assistance of counsel; and (10) the juvenile court failed to consider the best interests of the children.

While we sympathize with maternal grandfather’s desire to have an active role in raising the children and recognize that these proceedings have been unduly protracted and difficult, we cannot say the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying the Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition. However, we do conclude the court abused its discretion in terminating *589 supervised visitation for maternal grandparents. Accordingly, we will reverse the order terminating supervised visitation and remand to the juvenile court with directions.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case has a long history, much of which has been recounted in other opinions. At this point, the two sets of grandparents are fighting over the children. We set out a brief history.

The mother (mother) and the father (father) had two children, Mickel and Mallory. The children lived with mother and maternal grandparents until Mickel was four years old and Mallory was eight months old. During this time, Mickel formed a strong bond with maternal grandfather. On August 22, 2006, the children were made dependents of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300) 2 based on allegations that mother and father failed to protect or supervise the children and that mother suffered from mental illness, developmental disability or substance abuse. The children were placed with father. The agency offered mother reunification services.

On October 24, 2006, the agency filed a supplemental petition alleging that mother attacked father and paternal grandmother in father’s home, and that father failed to prevent mother from having contact with the children. The children were removed from father’s home and placed with a paternal aunt. On November 9, 2006, the petition was sustained and maternal grandparents were granted de facto parent status.

On June 19, 2007, reunification services to mother were denied, and reunification services were ordered for father.

Due to a medical situation in the paternal aunt’s family, the children needed to be moved. On August 7, 2007, maternal grandparents sought placement. The homes of both sets of grandparents were considered for placement, but mother was residing in maternal grandparents’ home. The agency was concerned that maternal grandparents could not protect the children from mother. The court placed the children with paternal grandparents. Maternal grandparents appealed the placement order and we affirmed (In re Mickel O. (June 26, 2008, F054035) [nonpub. opn.]).

On January 18, 2008, maternal grandparents filed a petition under section 388 to change a court order.

On April 15, 2008, paternal grandparents were granted de facto parent status. Mother’s motion to reinstate reunification services was denied, she appealed, and we affirmed (In re M.O. (Feb. 27, 2009, F055603) [nonpub. opn.]).

*590 On May 22, 2008, the parties agreed to participate in a bonding study.

On August 21, 2008, Pattee Russell-Curry (the expert) submitted the bonding study report to the social worker, Sandra Contreras (the social worker). As noted in the report, the social worker had requested that the expert determine which adults the children considered as parents, and explore the bonding between the children and their parents and grandparents. The expert first interviewed and observed the parties in her office, but found that the adults were tense and unnatural in the setting, so she decided to observe them at home where they would behave more naturally. Her report contained the following observations:

On August 26, 2008, reunification services for father were terminated and a section 366.26 hearing set. The children remained in paternal grandparents’ home and the court ordered monthly visits for mother and maternal grandparents.

On September 5, 2008, the expert wrote an addendum report directly to the juvenile court, voicing her concerns about the way the social worker, Sandra Contreras, was handling the case. She stated:

*598 The expert then explained that she had discovered a “ ‘cloud of suspicion’ ” over maternal grandfather that she could only substantiate “through rumor, innuendo, fears and suspicions . . . .” She said: “[B]ut [it] has no basis in any evidence, yet it is coloring all decisions that have been made in this case regarding [maternal grandfather], as far as I can tell.” The expert continued:

*599 The expert proceeded with her report, as follows:

On April 20, 2009, the expert wrote a second letter directly to the court, addressing section 366.26, as requested by maternal grandparents’ counsel *602 and mother’s counsel. The expert stated she believed that paternal grandparents were reluctantly going forward with adoption, not because they did not love the children, but because they were not planning on raising another family. The expert believed that they were providing a stable environment and that legal guardianship, not adoption, was the more appropriate arrangement. She also stated that the children were stable in paternal grandparents’ home and returning them to mother would be detrimental to them. “However, the primary caregiver was the maternal grandfather, and termination of contact with him and the extended family would be detrimental to [Mickel].” The expert believed that termination of contact would not be emotionally detrimental to Mallory, but she would lose contact with her ethnic heritage.

The expert also stated:

On April 20, 2009, a combined hearing commenced on the section 388 petition and the section 366.26 matter. The hearing took place during nine sessions over the course of 11 months. Testifying at the hearing were the social worker; the expert; another social worker, Kathleen Campell; Debbie Johnson, a witness to an incident involving paternal grandmother and Mallory; maternal grandparents; paternal grandfather; and the paternal aunt.

On June 12, 2009, maternal grandparents filed an amended section 388 petition, including notes and photographs. Maternal grandparents requested placement of the children in their home or unsupervised visitation. They *603 explained that the changes would benefit the children because the children were bonded to them and had been since well before the dependency proceedings had begun, paternal grandparents were not providing proper care, and the children were being emotionally abused in paternal grandparents’ home.

At the hearing, the expert testified that she had been requested by the social worker to report on whom the children identified as their primary parental figure and on the nature of the relationship of bonding and attachment with each parent and each grandparent. The social worker informed the expert that there was tension and conflict between the two families. This was the only time the expert had done this type of study without being asked to come to any conclusions or make any recommendations. In fact, the expert received at least two telephone calls from the social worker, specifically telling her not to make any recommendations in her report. The expert was puzzled by this demand and the social worker never provided her rationale. The expert could not reach the social worker, who left repeated messages for the expert stating, “Please, please, do not give any recommendations as to placement or custody of the children.” After the expert submitted her report, she learned that parental rights might be terminated. The social worker did not return the expert’s subsequent messages either.

When the expert observed the parties in her office setting, she found all of the adults to be very tense, nervous, and anxious. She felt she needed to observe them in their natural setting where she could get a more authentic view of their interactions. The social worker, however, left the expert a message stating that she was strongly opposed to the expert’s observing Mickel in maternal grandparents’ home and that paternal grandparents had some concerns about it too. Nevertheless, the expert insisted and ultimately conducted a visit in maternal grandparents’ home.

The expert testified about that home visit:

The expert testified that Mickel was bonded to maternal grandparents, particularly to maternal grandfather. Mickel was “definitely bonded primarily” to maternal grandfather. The expert stated:

The expert explained that primary bonds are crucial for children. She said: “. . . [Mickel] definitely appears to have the closest, most nurturing, secure-based kind of relationship with [maternal grandfather]. However, there have been environmental incidences that have happened that have impacted his ability to feel safe there. HQ ... HQ ... I believe that he has a secure basis with [maternal grandfather]; however, there’s been a lot of disruption and chaos in this little boy’s life. And because there were conflicts between [maternal grandfather] and [mother], I think that he’s become insecure in his ability to feel safe there.”

The expert continued:

*606 The expert explained that once a child has formed a primary bond, it can be very devastating if it is broken. When asked whether she believed it would be detrimental to Mickel if the bond between him and maternal grandfather were broken, the expert responded:

When asked whether she was able to determine the reason that maternal grandparents were having only supervised visits, in light of all her observations and all the documents she had reviewed, the expert answered that she had a professional guess. She explained: “I believe, in this case, um—well, I need to preface that. When I worked for the County as a Child Protective Service worker, I specialized in some particular forms of cases. And when I looked at all of the documents in this case, I had—I was under the impression that it was a particular—particular type of case. And when I approached each of the adults to ask them and to ask the social worker, um, I was able to get a little clearer understanding of why the case had gone the way it has. [f] . . . HO I believe that there is a—I believe that there is a belief, an assumption, a concern that’s never been really fully checked out or there hasn’t been a way to prove it, but it—I think it has really formed the direction this case has taken.”

In the expert’s professional opinion, she had no conclusive evidence that either maternal grandparent would pose a threat of harm to the children if they were to have unsupervised visits. The expert did, however, have concerns about maternal grandmother’s statements that could influence or confuse the children. For example, maternal grandmother said to Mickel in the expert’s presence, “Tell [the expert] you want to come home.” No other adult talked to the children in that way, but that was the type of problem the social workers were concerned about in unsupervised visits. The families need to understand that those comments, even if coming from love, care, and fear, can confound the problem and confuse the children. The expert believed that maternal grandparents would comply with a court order to keep mother away from the children. The expert explained: “I believe that [maternal grandparents] have been frightened of losing their only grandchildren and they have done everything in their power in the only way they knew how with great anxiety and distress to try to, you know, get their family back or—or deal with this. Unfortunately, they were the wrong choices, and it’s complicated this case, created a lot of tension. If they could be led to understand that there’s a way to maintain the relationship where their conduct is crucial to that continuing, that they behave in a more acceptable way and that’s defined, um, I would hope that they could.”

When asked if she believed part of the problem had been the treatment maternal grandparents had received from the agency, the expert stated: “I believe that the problem has been the perception of [maternal grandparents] without substantiated evidence.”

*608 Later, the expert stated: “When I took this case on, pretty quickly I was confused by some of the determinations and circumstances of the case. I was a sex abuse social worker for a number of years, and it looked like a sex abuse case to me. And so I started asking the different individuals, um, and if there was—I asked the social worker and the attorneys, some of the attorneys, and I was able to get some confirmation that there was some suspicion on the part of the social worker and [paternal grandparents]. However, there was no knowledge of there being anything that had ever been, um—you know, it hadn’t been opened up as a sex abuse case or investigated. I asked for all the court documents, all the social worker[’]s papers. There was a huge packet of stuff. I went through everything. I talked to everyone. I could find nothing that could substantiate that it was officially a sex abuse case, and yet it was handled like one. [][]... [][] There was—I could not find indications for why the children had not been returned, first of all, to the [maternal grandparents’] home. They had passed the home inspection, but there was great resistance. There was a lot of upset and concern—there was some vacations that Mickel went along with [maternal grandfather]. Well, there was—um, well, as I outlined in the papers, there were certain examples that were presented to me as indicating why there was suspicion, but those examples were really not something that would substantiate a case. They were more suspicions, and I couldn’t substantiate that there was anything further to determine it as a sex abuse case. [1] . . . [1] It appeared to me [the social workers] were [handling it as a sex abuse case], [1] . . . There was a lot of concern. They were really observing [maternal grandfather’s] movements. They were reading into the close proximity, the physical close proximity, the boundary issues between the child and the adult. They were concerned about whispering and contact and just really kind of seemed to scrutinize the behavior in ways that the social workers appeared to be alarmed at and concerned about as a boundary issue, as a personal space boundary issue, [f] ... [f] ... I suppose there could be some [personal space boundary issues] that are not [sex-abuse related]. But in the context in which this case was handled and the comments that were made, it appeared to be that those boundary personal space issues were being interpreted as potentially inappropriate touch, inappropriate boundary, colluding with secrets, which kind of go hand [in] hand with sexual abuse.”

When asked about the possibility that the bond between Mickel and maternal grandfather could be unhealthy, the expert answered:

Later, on the same subject, the expert stated: “I was specifically referring to . . . the imbalance in the attachment with [maternal grandfather] and the kind of ignoring or disrespect to the females in the family, that they’re—I think that’s trainable. I think there’s a way to train the adults in how to do behavior management to expect something different from him and how to reinforce and encourage an integration of more interaction with the'females in the family.”

The expert explained: “I believe that, given everything that’s transpired, that it would probably be, at this point, disruptive to remove [the children] from [paternal grandparents], but it would also be disruptive to sever the relationship with [maternal grandparents].”

The expert opined that termination of maternal grandparents’ relationship with Mickel would be detrimental to him. She continued: “The relationship that I observed indicated that Mickel has primarily identified [maternal grandfather] as the primary attachment and support base, um, that is his home. That’s his connection. That’s where he feels happy and loved. And I think to lose that significant relationship completely would be very hard for him. I think it could present in some issues of depression or other problems later on for him.”

The expert recommended unsupervised visitation with maternal grandparents. She stated that home visits with maternal grandparents would reduce anxiety so maternal grandparents could develop the relationships rather than reassuring the children that they are loved. Having longer and more frequent visits would allow them to move beyond showering the children with gifts and the indulgent behavior they exhibited when they saw the children only one hour per month. These home visits would provide a better assessment of how the interactions were going. This plan was for the benefit of the children, particularly Mickel.

*610 The expert believed that as long as mother was in maternal grandparents’ home, there was a risk of arguing, fighting, and altercation. If mother were not in the home, the children would feel more at ease. Mickel was conflicted because he loved maternal grandparents and missed his home, but he did not feel safe there. If the court ordered visitation, but there was still ongoing family discord, stirring up of trouble, and undermining of paternal grandparents, that would continue to be a disruptive or undermining influence for the children. Mother’s presence in the home was a major concern.

The expert said she referred in her September 5, 2008 letter to continuing to stir up trouble because paternal grandparents felt that there was disruption to their lives. The expert was not aware that anyone was arguing, but paternal grandparents had expressed some concern that they were continuing to have problems. The expert explained: “The purpose in—doing the visitation in the home and for extended periods of time, I think would reduce the anxiety and the anger and the resistance that [maternal grandparents] have demonstrated to the social workers. And I think if they were assured that they had a relationship with their grandchildren, that that might reduce their need to be as disruptive to the placement. If they understood this is the only way that they’re going to be able to have contact, that it could change the circumstances that have been evidenced so far.”

As for paternal grandparents, the expert believed they, like all the adults in this case, needed services. Paternal grandfather worked out of town during the week and came home on Friday for the weekend. “So he’s always re-entering the home. And what I see from many families where there is somebody commuting and re-entering the home on a weekly basis is there is often an imbalance of power and there is a struggle for re-establishing authority.” Paternal grandmother worked, and she was responsible for getting the children ready for school every day, feeding them dinner, and tucking them in.

Maternal grandparents introduced evidence of videos of a supervised visit in October 2009 and an unsupervised visit the court allowed at Christmas 2009. In the October visit, after the children excitedly greeted maternal grandparents, Mickel asked maternal grandfather when he was coming home. Maternal grandfather responded, “That’s a good question. We’re going to court next week to talk to the judge.” Then he told Mickel to “[s]ay [his] prayers to ask God to come home.” Mickel agreed and maternal grandfather told him he was a good boy.

On April 9, 2010, the court issued its 12-page written ruling, in which it denied maternal grandparents’ section 388 petition, and terminated parental rights.

*611 At the April 19, 2010 hearing, the court formalized its ruling. The next hearing was set for October 18, 2010, for an adoption review pursuant to section 366.3. When the court asked if there were any other matters to address, maternal grandparents’ counsel requested that the court reconsider allowing maternal grandparents unsupervised visits. The court responded that it would not reconsider unsupervised visitation. The court stated that it felt maternal grandfather’s response to Mickel’s question in October 2009 was not appropriate at all—“to even suggest [to Mickel] that he’s coming home or praying to God that he would come home. [][] I realize the emotions are involved, but to me it could have been handled differently. And I don’t know at some point I believe these children do need some peace in their lives. It seems like it’s been a lot of upheaval. So I wouldn’t consider unsupervised visits. I don’t know what the agency, as far as doing twice a month, supervised.”

County counsel responded that continued visitation, in light of the direction the case was taking, was “simply an invitation to continued litigation for as—until the adoption is finalized. [|] I think it’s much better for the parties and the children for any visitation to be worked out between [maternal grandparents] and [paternal grandparents]. That’s what’s going to happen after the adoption. . . . [f] [The agency’s] position is if there’s going to be contact between [Mickel] and his maternal grandparents, that should be in the hands of the prospective adoptive parents.”

Children’s counsel agreed that expediting the adoption was the goal and “to continue with visitation, even in a supervised setting, [would] continue an invitation for interruption or challenge to the efficient adoption proceedings. So [he was] opposed to it.”

Paternal grandparents’ counsel stated: “I would agree with [county counsel], and also say that I spoke with my client[s], and they are certainly willing to discuss the issue with [maternal grandparents]. They promise no particular outcome at this point. I don’t know that it serves anybody good to continue supervised visits when the long term prospect is parental rights are expected, or the visitation for formal visitations expected to be terminated.”

The court stated, “You know, I really thought about this a lot.” The following then occurred:

DISCUSSION

I. Section 388 Petition

Maternal grandfather contends the denial of his section 388 petition requesting placement of the children or unsupervised visitation with the children was an abuse of discretion. We recognize that reasonable minds might differ as to the correct outcome in this case, but we cannot say the juvenile court abused its discretion.

Maternal grandfather points to evidence of the social worker’s bias and lack of objectivity, including the social worker’s search of his bags (for toys) before he was allowed to visit with the children on one occasion, the social worker’s failure to investigate allegations of abuse and neglect at the hands of paternal grandparents, the social worker’s failure to ensure that mediation took place, 5 the social worker’s interference with the bonding study, and the *615 social worker’s inclusion of false information in her reports. The expert strongly believed that maternal grandfather had been treated with unsubstantiated suspicion by the agency. In fact, the expert was so disturbed by the agency’s actions that she wrote two letters directly to the court.

We agree there were issues of credibility and impartiality in this case, but we also recognize that these issues of bias were before the juvenile court and were for the court to weigh and decide. “It is the [juvenile] court’s role to assess the credibility of the various witnesses, to weigh the evidence to resolve the conflicts in the evidence. We have no power to judge the effect or value of the evidence, to weigh the evidence, to consider the credibility of witnesses or to resolve conflicts in the evidence or the reasonable inferences which may be drawn from that evidence. [Citation.]” (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 52-53 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 426 ].) The social worker’s bias and the source of her information were vigorously explored by counsel during cross-examination. Thus, the juvenile court was made aware of the evidence to which maternal grandfather points.

Nevertheless, because of our concern, we rely on evidence apart from that provided by the two social workers and conclude this independent evidence supported the juvenile court’s decision to deny maternal grandfather’s section 388 petition. We will explain.

Section 388 allows a parent or other person with an interest in a dependent child to petition the juvenile court to change, modify, or set aside any previous order. (§ 388, subd. (a).) “Section 388 provides the ‘escape mechanism’ that . . . must be built into the process to allow the court to consider new information.” (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 544 , 851 P.2d 826 ]; see also In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 447 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 751 , 862 P.2d 751 ]; In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 595 , 867 P.2d 706 ].) The petitioner has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that there is new evidence or a change of circumstances and (2) that the proposed modification would be in the best interests of the child. (§ 388; Nahid H. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1068 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 281 ]; In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 47 .) That is, “[i]t is not enough for [the petitioner] to show just a genuine change of circumstances under the statute. The [petitioner] must show that the undoing of the prior order would be in the best interests of the child. [Citation.]” (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 529 [ 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 495 ].) Furthermore, the petitioner must show changed, not changing, circumstances. (In re Casey D., supra, at p. 47.) The change of circumstances or new evidence “must be of such significant nature that it requires a setting aside or modification of the challenged prior order.” (Ansley v. Superior Court (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 477, 485 [ 229 Cal.Rptr. 771 ].)

*616 In considering whether the petitioner has made the requisite showing, the juvenile court may consider the entire factual and procedural history of the case. (In re Justice P. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181, 188-189 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 801 ].) The court may consider factors such as the seriousness of the reason leading to the child’s removal, the reason the problem was not resolved, the passage of time since the child’s removal, the relative strength of the bonds with the child, the nature of the change of circumstance, and the reason the change was not made sooner. (In re Aaliyah R. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 437, 446-447 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 876 ].) In assessing the best interests of the child, “a primary consideration ... is the goal of assuring stability and continuity.” (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317 .)

We review the juvenile court’s denial of a section 388 petition for an abuse of discretion. (In re Shirley K. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 65, 71 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 897 ].) The court “exceeds the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd determination.” (Ibid.) The test for abuse of discretion is whether the court exceeded the bounds of reason. “ [‘]The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.’ [Citation.]’’ (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 318-319.)

Under this standard of review, we must conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the evidence did not establish that placing the children with maternal grandparents would be in the children’s best interests, or that allowing unsupervised visitation with maternal grandparents would be in the children’s best interests.

Although the expert recognized the strong and loving relationship between maternal grandfather and Mickel, and the critical importance of that bond in Mickel’s life, she also unequivocally stated that Mickel and Mallory should not be moved from paternal grandparents’ home. Mickel told her that he felt most secure now in paternal grandparents’ home. She believed Mickel required the stability he had found with paternal grandparents, but also relied on his close relationship with maternal grandfather. As for Mallory, she was settled in paternal grandparents’ home and was forming attachments to paternal grandparents. The expert opined that the optimal outcome for the children would be the stability and security of paternal grandparents’ home, with frequent and regular home visitation with maternal grandparents. Thus, the expert’s reports and testimony provided evidence to support the juvenile court’s determination that moving the children from paternal grandparents’ home to maternal grandparents’ home would not be in the children’s best interests.

*617 And although the expert believed that the children could enjoy unsupervised visitation in maternal grandparents’ home, she based her opinion on a situation without animosity, anger, and disruption. She stated that visitation could succeed if the arrangement were handled “civilly, without malice,” and she stressed that “if the family continues to stir up trouble, to fight, to undermine [paternal grandparents], this is absolutely detrimental to these children.” From this and other evidence, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude that unsupervised visitation, which had led to disruption, was not currently in the children’s best interest.

The court’s decisions to deny placement and unsupervised visitation were not arbitrary, capricious, or beyond the bounds of reason. The court’s goal was to promote the children’s best interests, which at this point were permanency and stability (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317 ), and to put an end to the upheaval in their troubled lives. While there was ample evidence that Mickel’s relationship with maternal grandfather was positive and important, there was also evidence that maternal grandparents were creating confusion and disruption by talking about the case with the children and telling them they would be coming home. Maternal grandfather’s anger was manifested in Mickel’s attitude and he was acting out with paternal grandmother.

Despite the outcome of this sad case, we are hopeful that the two sets of grandparents can rise above their personal conflicts and create an open, extended family for the benefit of these children. Maternal grandfather obviously plays an important role in Mickel’s life, which, if managed for the good of Mickel, could continue to nurture and support him even if he is adopted by paternal grandparents. We sincerely hope the grandparents, all of whom are beneficial to and loved by the children, can work together to provide love and stability rather than discord, chaos, and confusion in the children’s lives.

II. Termination of Supervised Visitation

At the end of the final hearing, after terminating parental rights and denying maternal grandparents’ section 388 petition, the juvenile court summarily terminated maternal grandparents’ supervised visitation with the children, effectively severing all contact between them and extinguishing arguably the most important relationship in Mickel’s life. Unrefuted evidence presented by the expert demonstrated that Mickel’s relationship with maternal grandfather was the most closely attached and bonded relationship in Mickel’s life. The bond between Mickel and maternal grandfather was “primary, fundamental and intense,” and Mickel displayed authentic despair when required to leave maternal grandfather’s presence.

*618 We recognize that once parental rights are terminated and a child is referred for adoption, the department or licensed adoption agency “shall be responsible for the custody and supervision of the child and shall be entitled to the exclusive care and control of the child at all times until a petition for adoption . . . .” (§ 366.26, subd. (j).) In this regard, the agency’s decisions during this period are subject to the juvenile court’s review for abuse of discretion. (See Department of Social Services v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 721, 733-734 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 239 ]; Amber R. v. Superior Court (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 897, 900-903 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 297 ].) In this case, termination of visitation was heavily promoted by county counsel and thereafter ordered by the court. The record demonstrates that the court and the parties ultimately agreed that the court had authority to terminate visitation. We conclude for the reasons we explain below that, regardless of whether the decision properly rested with the agency or the court, termination of visitation was an abuse of discretion.

First, termination of supervised visitation had never been an issue during the course of the prolonged hearing. After the juvenile court issued its written ruling, a hearing was held to discuss the ruling. Because the section 388 petition had been denied, maternal grandparents’ counsel orally requested increased supervised visitation. In response, county counsel suggested that in light of the adoption goal, termination of all visitation would be appropriate. The court ultimately agreed, explaining that the children would “probably end up being adopted by [paternal grandparents].” The court seemed to believe that maternal grandparents might as well get a head start on adjusting to the inevitability of adoption by paternal grandparents and learning to live without any contact with the children they dearly loved. Although the court believed the children would benefit from this complete severing of contact with maternal grandparents (in the interest of stability, permanency and certainty), we see nothing in the record indicating that supervised visitation should cease because of the possible adoption in the future.

Maternal grandparents were obviously blindsided by this last-minute decision and the summary manner in which all contact with their beloved grandchildren was abruptly terminated. Maternal grandparents’ counsel argued vigorously, exclaiming to the court he was “absolutely beside [him] self ’ that this decision could be made in this manner. Furthermore, he could not comprehend how an abrupt severance of all contact could possibly be in the children’s best interest. Despite the protestations of maternal grandparents’ counsel, the court stated it believed maternal grandparents “had a chance to present all the evidence they would want to present.” But maternal grandparents were afforded no opportunity to argue or present evidence to rebut county counsel’s motion on the specific topic of supervised visitation, which maternal grandparents had assumed would continue at least until the children *619 were adopted. In our opinion, the court erred in denying maternal grandparents a full and fair hearing on the issue.

In addition, we stress that adoption by paternal grandparents at this point was not a foregone conclusion and the court’s termination of all visitation with maternal grandparents for that reason was error. At that point, any number of events could have changed the course of the proceedings (as they still could) and maternal grandparents, excluded from the process by termination of visitation, would no longer be in the best position to participate. This outcome would be detrimental to the children. Finally, we note that neither termination of mother’s parental rights nor denial of maternal grandparents’ section 388 petition had any effect on maternal grandparents’ ongoing status as de facto parents.

Second, the court’s order terminating all visitation with maternal grandparents foreordained the outcome in this case by rendering the issue of mediation moot. The order effectively informed paternal grandparents that any effort toward mediation or other forms of cooperation was simply no longer required, or even encouraged. The order eliminated whatever motivation paternal grandparents, who had already proven resistant to visitation requests, might have had to allow visitation for the sake of the children, particularly Mickel, who was so tightly bonded to maternal grandfather. As the expert opined, the optimal outcome for the children included liberal visitation with maternal grandparents, provided the grandparents could work together to create a peaceful and nondisruptive relationship. But all prospects for crafting an improved relationship between the acrimonious grandparents through mediation or other forms of cooperation evaporated upon the court’s order.

Moreover, we believe the juvenile court should have actively pursued the prospect of mediation between the grandparents. Although the parties had previously agreed to participate in a “family group decision-making conference,” it never occurred, apparently due to animosity between the grandparents or refusal by one or more of the grandparents. Mediation can save both families and court resources, as explained in Justice Dawson’s concurrence, and we think the court should have inquired into the reasons why no mediation had occurred and encouraged the parties to reconsider and participate. The evidence plainly established the importance of visitation between Mickel and maternal grandfather, and an effort should have been made to promote that outcome rather than dooming it to failure or acquiescing to its futility. 6

*620 In our opinion, the decision to terminate visitation exceeded the bounds of reason and thus constituted an abuse of discretion. (See In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 318-319.) We therefore reverse the juvenile court’s order terminating supervised visitation between maternal grandparents and the children. As a result, the previous visitation order is immediately reinstated and maternal grandparents are entitled to prompt resumption of supervised visitation with the children. We also direct the juvenile court to place the matter on calendar for the court and the parties to consider mediation with a view to a possible long-term and/or postadoptive visitation agreement (see Fam. Code, § 8616.5) that allows the children to maintain their relationships with both sets of grandparents, despite any issues remaining between the grandparents. Our concerns and desires in this regard are eloquently stated by Justice Poochigian in his concurring opinion.

Lastly, in light of the allegations of bias and a deteriorated relationship between the social worker(s) and maternal grandparents, we conclude that a new relationship would facilitate the progress of the case. For this reason, we direct the juvenile court to order the agency to assign a new social worker to the case for all purposes, including supervision of visitation. We expect that maternal grandparents will be treated with objectivity and respect by the agency and its agents; conversely, we expect maternal grandparents to finally recognize the potential harm that can come from their comments to the children about returning to maternal grandparents’ home. The goal at this point is to reunite the children with maternal grandparents and restore visitation for the good of the children under the current circumstances. This goal cannot be met with a strategy that undermines, agitates, or creates animosity and discord. Such a strategy serves only to advance the adult drama at the expense of the children’s well-being.

III. Consideration as Prospective Adoptive Parents

Maternal grandfather contends the adoption assessment was not conducted in accordance with section 366.21, subdivision (i) because the social worker limited her consideration to parental grandparents who had had custody of the children for over six months. After the agency’s reference to section 366.26, subdivision (k), maternal grandfather counters that paternal grandparents did not qualify for preference because a “substantial emotional attachment” was lacking, as evidenced by the expert’s bonding study.

We disagree that the bonding study contained no evidence of a substantial emotional attachment between the children and paternal grandparents. “When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding or order is challenged on appeal, even where the standard of proof in the trial court is clear and convincing evidence, the reviewing court must determine if there is any *621 substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible and of solid value—to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. [Citations.] In making this determination, we recognize that all conflicts are to be resolved in favor of the prevailing party and that issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trier of fact. [Citations.] The reviewing court may not reweigh the evidence when assessing the sufficiency of the evidence. [Citation.]” (In re Jasmine C. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 71, 75 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 493 ].)

Although the evidence established that Mickel’s strongest attachment was with maternal grandfather, there was evidence that the children had formed substantial emotional attachments to paternal grandparents. The expert stated that Mickel felt most secure in paternal grandparents’ home and that the children were attached to paternal grandparents. Mickel relied emotionally on paternal grandmother and desired to establish a warm, nurturing relationship with paternal grandfather. The children were still learning to communicate with paternal grandparents, but they appeared to feel settled and safe at their home and they readily told paternal grandparents they loved them and sought physical closeness with them. The evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding.

IV. Paternal Grandparents’ De Facto Parent Status

Maternal grandfather argues that paternal grandparents should not have been granted de facto parent status because there was evidence that paternal grandmother abused Mallory in the incident reported by Debbie Johnson. Johnson witnessed Mallory crying and running barefoot in the winter far behind paternal grandmother, who was pushing a stroller along a busy street. Eventually, Mallory caught up and got into the stroller. Evidence of this incident was before the juvenile court and it was required to weigh the evidence and judge the credibility of the witnesses; we have no power to do so. (In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at pp. 52-53; In re Jasmine C., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 75.)

V. Ineffective Assistance by Children’s Counsel

Maternal grandfather explains that children’s counsel was ineffective because he failed to meet with the children to determine their wishes, as required by section 317, subdivision (e), and consistently agreed with the agency, thereby failing to advocate for the children and revealing his bias. As a result, maternal grandfather asserts, the juvenile court could not consider the children’s wishes because they were not made known by children’s counsel, and thus the court failed to act in the best interests of the children.

“ ‘To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, [maternal grandfather] must demonstrate that (1) counsel’s representation was deficient in *622 falling below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) counsel’s deficient representation subjected [maternal grandfather] to prejudice, i.e., there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s failings, the result would have been more favorable to [maternal grandfather]. [Citations.]’ ” (In re Jones (1996) 13 Cal.4th 552, 561 [ 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 52 , 917 P.2d 1175 ]; see Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 [ 80 L.Ed.2d 674 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ]; In re Emilye A. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1695, 1711 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 294 ].)

Assuming that children’s counsel failed to competently represent the children’s interests by failing to meet with them and by siding with the agency, we cannot say maternal grandfather has shown that the outcome would have been different had counsel performed competently. The expert impartially reported the children’s wishes. For example, she recognized that Mickel wanted to go “home” to maternal grandparents’ home, but that he hated the strife he had witnessed there and liked the stability of paternal grandparents’ home. Mallory was too young to voice her opinions, but she was becoming particularly attached to paternal grandfather. Under these circumstances, we believe the court received the information it required to properly consider the children’s wishes.

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s order terminating maternal grandparents’ supervised visitation with the children is reversed. The matter is remanded to the juvenile court with directions to immediately reinstate the previous visitation order, to order the agency to assign the case to a new social worker, and to set the matter on calendar for a hearing during which the court and the parties will consider mediation and the prospects for a visitation . agreement to promote the children’s best interests in maintaining relationships with both sets of grandparents. In all other respects, the juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.

Dawson, Acting P. J., and Poochigian, J., concurred.

The Merced County Human Services Agency.

All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise noted.

The expert later defined “enmeshed” as follows: “I think that it means there is an overinvestment or an overinvolvement that may, again, hinder the child’s ability to do things independently and develop mastery.”

The expert later testified that “no one else” referred to the social worker and paternal grandparents.

Maternal grandfather argues that mediation was ordered by the court, but the record instead suggests the parties agreed to seek mediation. Thus, it was not the job of the social worker or the juvenile court to ensure the parties followed through with their own agreement. We note that the social worker testified that a provider met with the families and determined there was so much animosity between them that a family conference would not be appropriate.

We note that at least one court has held that under certain circumstances the juvenile court maintains the authority to order visitation following adoption. (In re Hirenia C. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 504 [ 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 443 ].)