Brennan

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Stephanie Crowley Brennan appeals from a judgment entered in favor of her former employer, Townsend & O’Leary Enterprises, Inc., and a former manager at Townsend & O’Leary Enterprises, Scott Montgomery (collectively referred to as defendants), after the trial court granted defendants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV motion). The court granted the JNOV motion on the ground insufficient evidence supported a finding plaintiff had been subjected to severe or pervasive harassment based on her gender.

We affirm. The California Supreme Court has set forth the legal standards to be applied in determining whether a plaintiff has demonstrated severe or pervasive harassment based on gender. (See Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035 [ 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 636 , 209 P.3d 963 ] (Hughes); Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television Productions (2006) 38 Cal.4th 264 [ 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 2 , 132 P.3d 211 ] (Lyle).) Applying those legal standards to the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, we must conclude insufficient evidence supported a finding plaintiff was subjected to severe or pervasive *1340 harassment based on her…

For years, Stephanie Crowley Brennan went along to get along at advertising agency Townsend & O’Leary Enterprises, Inc., accepting an environment where the word “bitch” was used almost routinely, Christmas party skits included demeaning roles for women, and female clients were referred to by disgusting epithets. She survived and even thrived professionally, until the blatant sexism of this workplace was directed squarely at her, and she was referred to by an executive as the “big-titted, mindless one.” At that point, she complained and said enough is enough, as women are permitted to do under the law. But from the moment of her complaint, the atmosphere surrounding her job changed completely. It made no difference that she wanted to help to change the company’s culture, as Steve O’Leary, the agency’s owner, had asked her to do. Once she complained, she became a marked woman, and had no choice but to find other employment.

My key point of disagreement with the majority opinion is its conclusion that the nonsexual acts of retaliation that took place cannot be considered *1364 discrimination due to gender. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1360-1361.) The evidence of such retaliation was…