Miranda

People v. Miranda

Good Law
132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 315·199 Cal. App. 4th 1403·2011 Cal. App. LEXIS 1308
Court of Appeal of CaliforniaOctober 18, 2011No. B224163California13,943 words

Opinion

Lead Opinion

Kriegler, J.

We hold that substantial evidence supports the jury’s findings that the 15-year-old sexual assault victim, who suffered from cerebral palsy resulting in severe communication difficulties combined with physical disabilities, was mentally incapable of consenting to the sexual offenses committed upon her by defendant. Defendant’s additional contentions regarding insufficiency of the evidence, prejudicial exclusion of evidence of a prior false accusation of sexual assault, instructional error, and denial of equal protection in requiring lifetime registration as a sex offender, are also unmeritorious. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Robert Frank Miranda was convicted of the following offenses upon Jane Doe, a person physically or mentally incapable of giving consent: count 1—attempted rape (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 261, subd. (a)(1)); 1 count 2—oral copulation (§ 288a, subd. (g)); and count 3—sexual penetration (§ 289, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced defendant to 11 years in state prison.

FACTS

Prosecution Evidence

Fifteen-year-old Jane Doe slept in a trailer with her father and 13-year-old brother, Vincent, on a Sunday night in October 2008. Someone sleeps with *1408…

Concurring Opinion

Mosk, J.

I concur.

Defendant’s contention on appeal as to the insufficiency of evidence that Jane Doe had a mental disorder preventing her from giving legal consent is arguable, although, ultimately I concur in the majority’s opinion. Defendant correctly argues—as the Attorney General concedes—that the trial court erred in failing, sua sponte, to instruct the jury as to the meaning of “legal consent” in Penal Code 1 sections 261, subdivision (a)(1), 288a, subdivision (g), and 289, subdivision (b). But that error was not prejudicial.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

A. Relevant Legal Principles

The charged crime of rape of an incompetent person consists of “an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person not the spouse of the perpetrator .. . [f] [wjhere a person is incapable, because of a mental disorder or developmental or physical disability, of giving legal consent, and this is known or reasonably should be known to the person committing the act.” (§ 261, subd. (a)(1).) The charged crime of oral copulation of an incompetent person consists of an act of oral copulation where “the victim is at the time *1430 incapable, because of a mental disorder or developmental or physical…

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