In re Young

—Petitioner Andrew Young seeks a writ of habeas corpus arising from his denial of parole by the Board of Parole Hearings (Board). The Board’s decision was principally based on its conclusion that petitioner lacked insight into what the Board considered to be a particularly egregious crime and why he committed it.

The Board’s decision must be vacated because it does not meet what our Supreme Court has repeatedly stated are two basic imperatives of due *293 process. As the court most recently discussed in In re Shaputis (2011) 53 Cal.4th 192 [ 134 Cal.Rptr.3d 86 , 265 P.3d 253 ] (Shaputis II), the Board must, consistent with due process, answer the “essential question” of “whether the inmate currently poses a threat to public safety” by conducting “an individualized inquiry into the inmate’s suitability for parole,” “draw[ing] .. . answers from the entire record, including the facts of the offense, the inmate’s progress during incarceration, and the insight he or she has achieved into past behavior.” (Id. at pp. 220, 219, 221.) Under our highly deferential “ ‘some evidence’ ” standard of review, we do not reweigh the evidence. (Id. at p. 221.) Rather, we uphold the Board’s…

I respectfully dissent. I believe that the majority’s opinion (1) substantially ignores the standard of review that we are required to give to decisions of the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) under our Supreme Court’s most recent, and clearly now controlling, decision of In re Shaputis (2011) 53 Cal.4th 192 [ 134 Cal.Rptr.3d 86 , 265 P.3d 253 ] (Shaputis II) and (2) also either ignores or discards the several other factors (i.e., the factors in addition to the conceded “egregious nature” of the offense) (see maj. opn., ante, at pp. 317-319) which clearly establish there was and is “some evidence” supporting the Board’s decision regarding the petitioner’s lack of suitability for parole, particularly his current “lack of insight” (see Shaputis II, at pp. 217-220).

First of all, in concluding its unanimous decision in Shaputis II, our Supreme Court listed five factors governing review by the judicial branch of Board decisions regarding suitability for parole. (Shaputis II, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 220-221.) In the interest of brevity, I will not quote them all but, first *320 of all, observe that its second point related to the Board’s decision regarding “the insight [the inmate]…