Harbor Regional Center v. Office of Administrative Hearings

Harbor Regional Center (Harbor) appeals from the judgment in this administrative mandate action, contending that the trial court erred by determining that an administrative law judge (ALJ) from the state’s Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) had jurisdiction under the Lanterman Developmental Disabilities Services Act (Lanterman Act or Act; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 4500 et seq.) to order the center to pay a higher wage to the in-home care provider of a severely disabled girl. 1 We conclude that under the circumstances of this case, jurisdiction to hear such disputes rests with the OAH, and therefore affirm the judgment.

INTRODUCTION

After several years of acquiescing to administrative law orders to fund salaries above the established rate to the caregivers of a profoundly disabled girl receiving services under the Lanterman Act, Harbor chose to dispute a temporary pay increase of approximately $1,650 for a substitute caregiver. At issue over this small sum are the rights of developmentally disabled children to contest decisions by service agencies such as Harbor to refuse funding for pay increases above the state-approved general rate. We hold that such increases may be…

I respectfully dissent.

This appeal presents two issues for resolution. First, whether the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) had jurisdiction to order Harbor Regional Center (Harbor) to reimburse Hannah G., 1 a consumer of disability services, for her out-of-pocket expenditures that supplemented the hourly wage rate paid to her caregiver, Irma Murphy, by Murphy’s employer, Cambrian Home Care, a Harbor vendor. Second, whether the OAH had jurisdiction to order Harbor to provide additional funding so that Murphy will receive an increase in her hourly wage from Cambrian. Both issues arise in a context in which Harbor and Cambrian negotiated hourly rates for the services provided by Cambrian, based on the type of service involved, and included those negotiated hourly rates in a vendor contract that was subject to regulation by the State Department of Developmental Services (DDS).

*318 I am compelled to follow the plain language of the legislation governing this issue, which ensures that each and all of California’s recipients of developmental disability services are treated equitably. As a result, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the OAH had jurisdiction to order…