Cuevas

1. Introduction

Under statutes in effect in March 2011, a person could be committed involuntarily to the State Department of Developmental Services (Department) for up to one year after a petition alleged (Welf. & Inst. Code, former § 6500; Stats. 1996, ch. 1076, § 5, p. 7265) 1 and a court found “that the person is mentally retarded, and that he or she is a danger to himself, herself, or to others.” (Former § 6509; see Stats. 1996, ch. 1076, § 8.5, p. 7268.) 2 That is what has happened in this case with Ronald Cuevas. 3 After a petition and a court trial, the court committed Ronald to the director of the Department for a year beginning on July 11, 2011.

On appeal, Ronald asserts there were constitutional defects in his commitment. He argues that People v. Bailie (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 841 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 761 ] (Bailie) and People v. Sweeney (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 210 [ 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 557 ] (Sweeney) require the petition to allege and the court to find not simply that he is mentally retarded and dangerous, but that his mental *97 retardation is a cause of his dangerousness. He also asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support such a finding.

Ronald…

Concurring. As noted in the majority opinion, People v. Sweeney (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 210 [ 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 557 ] (Sweeney) requires—in addition to the statutory requirements “that the person is mentally retarded, and that he or she is a danger to himself, herself, or to others” (Welf. & Inst. Code, former § 6509; Stats. 1996, ch. 1076, § 8.5, p. 7268.) 1 —that mental retardation is a substantial factor in causing serious difficulty in controlling dangerous behavior. (Sweeney, supra, at p. 225 .) But my review of what Sweeney and People v. Bailie (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 841 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 761 ] (Bailie) cite as precedent for this additional requirement compels me to write separately to identify a problem not raised by the parties in this case: that Bailie and Sweeney represent an unwarranted judicial extension to the mentally retarded of decisions by the Supreme Courts of California and the United States primarily involving sexually violent predators (SVPs) and former juvenile offenders who continue to be dangerous.

I will explain below that neither substantive nor procedural due process compels as a condition precedent to a section 6500 civil commitment that a person manifests…