David L. Adams v. R.S. Peterson, Superintendent of O.S.C.I.

David Adams appeals from the district court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Adams claims that his Oregon convictions for burglary, rape, and sodomy violated his right to due process of law because a state court judge entered judgment on stipulated facts and failed to advise him on the record of the legal consequences of the stipulation. We now affirm.

I

In November 1981, Adams, who was seventeen years old at the time, was indicted in the Lane County Circuit Court on charges of first-degree rape, sodomy, and burglary of a female schoolteacher. Adams agreed to stipulate to certain facts at trial rather than to proceed through the more usual presentations of evidence by both the prosecution and the defense. Adams so agreed on the advice of his attorney, who indicated that Adams’s prior juvenile record, along with the nature and cir- *837 eumstances of his crime, might lead to a harsher sentence if he was convicted following an extended trial. In addition, in return for Adams’s agreeing to a stipulated-facts trial, the state agreed to dismiss two other indictments then pending against him.

Adams repeatedly told his attorney that he wanted to testify. On…

KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge,

While I join the majority opinion, I find this case much closer than either the majority or the dissent acknowledges. On the one hand, Adams never entered a formal guilty plea. Majority at 839. On the other, Adams did just about everything else to assure his conviction. Dissent at 848. Should Adams have to go through the formality of a guilty plea in order to be entitled to the procedure specified in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969)?

The answer to this question turns on whether one reads Boykin as embodying the requirements of due process or as merely announcing a prophylactic rule— one that can be violated without necessarily violating the Constitution. If Boykin embodies constitutional requirements, it cannot be circumvented by structuring a guilty plea so as to avoid using the phrase “I plead guilty”; if it is a prophylactic rule, however, procedural niceties can matter a great deal.

While the point certainly is debatable, I conclude that Boykin created a prophylactic rule. One indication of this comes from juxtaposing Boykin with Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 831 , 89 S.Ct. 1498 , 23 L.Ed.2d 16 (1969),…

dissenting, joined by Judges PREGERSON and NORRIS:

I wholeheartedly agree with Judge Pre-gerson’s discussion of the flaws in the majority’s analysis of Adams’ claim. The nature of the stipulation in this case belies the majority’s assertion that the judge merely inferred guilt. The stipulation established both facts and unavoidable legal conclusions. The stipulation admitted of no contrary inferences. The finding of guilt was ineluctable. While a strong argument can be made that Boykin does not apply when a stipulation permits conflicting inferences or alternative legal conclusions, that is not this case. Just like the guilty plea in Boykin, this stipulation was more than an admission that Adams committed various acts. “[I]t is itself a conviction; nothing remains but to give judgment and determine punishment.” Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 , 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711-12 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). To adopt the majority’s distinction is to engage in legalistic hair-splitting, and to exalt form over substance at the expense of constitutional rights.

I write separately simply to express my deep regret and frustration over the majority’s and concurrence’s talismanic devotion to…

dissenting, joined by Judges TANG and NORRIS:

Adams signed a stipulation admitting the existence beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of the charged offenses. In my view, this is tantamount to a guilty plea. We took this case en banc to decide whether Adams is entitled to the same constitutional protections accorded defendants who plead guilty. The majority concludes wrongly that Adams was not entitled to these protections.

I cannot imagine what more Adams could have done to acknowledge his guilt short of uttering, “I plead guilty.” Adams’s stipulation tracked the words of the indictment identically. He stated that “[w]ith respect to Count II of the indictment charging Rape in the First Degree, the defendant ... did unlawfully and knowingly cause his penis to penetrate the vagina of Marylee Donley, a female, and at the time of his sexual intercourse, Marylee Donley was subjected to forcible compulsion by the defendant.” Adams’s admissions of guilt to the burglary and sodomy charges were equally comprehensive.

Adams’s stipulation also revealed his intent, a fact uniquely within his own knowledge. Adams stated that “the defendant, without consent, legal authority, or other…

968 F.2d 835 David L. ADAMS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. R.S. PETERSON, Superintendent of O.S.C.I., Respondent-Appellee. No. 87-4191. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued En Banc and Submitted March 19, 1992. Decided June 24, 1992. Stephen R. Sady, Chief Deputy Federal Public Defender, Portland, Or., for petitioner-appellant. Rives Kistler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, Or., for respondent-appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. Before: WALLACE, Chief Judge, TANG, PREGERSON, NORRIS, WIGGINS, BRUNETTI, KOZINSKI, O'SCANNLAIN, TROTT, FERNANDEZ, and KLEINFELD, Circuit Judges. O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge: 1 David Adams appeals from the district court's dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Adams claims that his Oregon convictions for burglary, rape, and sodomy violated his right to due process of law because a state court judge entered judgment on stipulated facts and failed to advise him on the record of the legal consequences of the stipulation. We now affirm. 2 * In November 1981, Adams, who was seventeen years old at the time, was indicted in the Lane County Circuit Court on charges of first-degree rape, sodomy,…