Chapter 13 debtors Keith and Linda Pinkstaff appeal from the district court’s affirmance of the bankruptcy court’s dismissal of their claim against the United States for damages, attorney’s fees and costs under 11 U.S.C. § 362 (h), arguing that the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) willfully violated the automatic stay in their case by filing a notice of federal income tax lien after the Pinkstaffs had filed their bankruptcy petition. We reverse and remand.

A debtor injured by a creditor’s willful violation of a stay is entitled to recover his actual damages, including costs and attorney’s fees, resulting from that violation. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (h). As defined by this court,

Goichman v. Bloom (In re Bloom), 875 F.2d 224, 227 (9th Cir.1989). As it is undisputed that the IRS “acted with knowledge of the bankruptcy filing,” see Carroll v. Tri-Growth Centre City, Ltd. (In re Carroll), 903 F.2d 1266, 1272 (9th Cir.1990), it necessarily follows that the government willfully violated the automatic stay. See id.

Effectively conceding all of the above, the government argues that it is not liable in damages to the Pinkstaffs because it is protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. We disagree.

11 U.S.C. § 106 (a). This provision unequivocally expresses the government’s consent to be sued for money damages whenever a compulsory counterclaim is brought in response to a claim filed by the government. United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 1015 , 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992). Accord Sullivan v. Town & Country Home Nursing Servs., Inc. (In re Town & Country), 963 F.2d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir.1992) (“When a governmental unit formally invokes the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court by filing a proof of claim, the government’s exposure to counterclaim liability under section 106(a) is unquestioned.”).

In determining what constitutes a compulsory counterclaim, we apply the so-called “logical relationship” test of Fed.R.Civ.P. 13(a). Pochiro v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 827 F.2d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir.1987). For purposes of section 106(a),

United States v. Bulson (In re Bulson), 117 B.R. 537, 541 (Bankr. 9th Cir.1990) (citations omitted), aff'd by memorandum, 974 F.2d 1341 [(table)] (9th Cir.1992).

The court in In re Bulson applied the above test to facts virtually identical to those presented in the instant appeal, and reached the following conclusion:

Id. We accept the above as our holding here.

Because we are unable to determine the extent of the Pinkstaffs’ actual damages caused by the government’s violation of the automatic stay, we must remand this case to the district court with instructions to remand to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings consistent with the above. See In re Carroll, 903 F.2d at 1272 .

REVERSED and REMANDED.

. That provision reads in its entirety: "An individual injured by any willful violation of a stay provided by this section shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorney’s fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages.” . We note in passing that one bankruptcy court has stated in dictum that the BAP’s decision in In re Bulson was overruled by our opinion in Pearson v. United States (In re Pearson), 917 F.2d 1215 (9th Cir.1991). See In re Spencer, 123 B.R. 858, 862 (Bankr.N.D.Cal.1990). This is incorrect. In re Pearson deals with the scope of the government’s sovereign immunity under 11 U.S.C. § 106 (c), while In re Bulson discusses that subject under 11 U.S.C. § 106 (a). Whatever confusion may have existed on that point has been cleared up by the Supreme Court's recent holding in United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1011 , 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992), as well as our own opinion in In re Town & Country, 963 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir.1992). In fairness to both the bankruptcy and district courts, however, we note that they did not have the benefit of either the Supreme Court’s ruling in Nordic Village or our holding in In re Town & Country, which we deem controlling.