The issue in this case is whether multiple convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c) arising from the same indictment require the statute’s enhanced penalties for repeat offenders. We find that the statute by its plain language requires the enhanced penalties.

I

A grand jury indicted Denard Darnell Neal on three counts of bank robbery and three counts of using a firearm in a crime *602 of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c). The indictment charged that Neal robbed a bank in Phoenix, Arizona, on November 10, 1989, a second bank in Tucson, Arizona, on November 29, 1989, and a third bank in Yuma, Arizona, on December 7, 1989. The indictment charged that Neal used a firearm in connection with all three robberies.

A jury found Neal guilty on all counts. The district judge sentenced Neal to 125 months on each of the three bank robbery counts with those sentences to be served concurrently. On the firearms counts, the judge sentenced Neal to five years on the first count, twenty years on the second count, and twenty years on the third count, with those sentences to be served consecutively to each other and to the bank robbery sentence.

Neal’s total sentence is 55 years and five months, with 45 years of that sentence arising from the mandatory sentencing provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c).

II

Neal argues that the district judge erred by concluding that section 924(c) requires enhanced penalties for multiple convictions arising from the same indictment. Neal argues in essence that the proper sentence for three violations of section 924(c) arising from the same indictment is five years on each of the three firearms counts instead of five years on the first count and twenty years each on the second and third counts.

We review statutory interpretation de novo. See United States v. Ibarra-Alcarez, 830 F.2d 968, 971 (9th Cir.1987). Section 924(c)(1) provides in pertinent part:

18 U.S.C. § 924 (c)(1).

When interpreting a statute, we first look to the plain meaning of the statute’s language. See United States v. Van Winrow, 951 F.2d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir.1991) (per curiam). “When the plain language of the statute appears to settle the question, we look to the legislative history to determine only whether there is a clearly expressed legislative intention contrary to that language.” S & M Inv. Co. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 911 F.2d 324, 327 (9th Cir.1990) (citations omitted), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 963 , 112 L.Ed.2d 1050 (1991).

We find that the meaning of “second or subsequent conviction” is plain in the context of this statute. There is nothing in the simple wording of this statute that requires that an offense underlying a second conviction occur after the conviction for the first offense. The only requirement is that a conviction be second or subsequent, not that any offense underlying that conviction follow a first conviction.

We also are not persuaded by Neal’s argument that the convictions at least must be the product of separate indictments. We agree with the Fourth Circuit’s analysis:

United States v. Raynor, 939 F.2d 191, 193 (4th Cir.1991) (quoting United States v. Rawlings, 821 F.2d 1543, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 979 , 108 S.Ct. 494 , 98 *603 L.Ed.2d 492 (1987)). The Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits agree the enhanced penalties of section 924(c) apply for repeat offenses contained in a single indictment. See United States v. Bernier, 954 F.2d 818, 819-21 (2d Cir.1992) (per curiam), petition for cert. filed (June 29, 1992) (No. 92-5025); United States v. Bennett, 908 F.2d 189, 194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 534 , 112 L.Ed.2d 544 (1990); United States v. Nabors, 901 F.2d 1351, 1358 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 192 , 112 L.Ed.2d 154 (1990); United States v. Foote, 898 F.2d 659, 668 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 112 , 112 L.Ed.2d 81 (1990).

Only the Tenth Circuit has reached a contrary conclusion. See United States v. Abreu, 962 F.2d 1447 (10th Cir.1992) (en banc), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 220 , 121 L.Ed.2d 158 . We simply do not agree with that court that the language of the statute is ambiguous. While as a matter of policy it might be desirable to impose enhanced penalties for repeat offenses only after the offender has already been punished for a first offense, a plausible policy argument may also be made that it makes sense to treat repeat offenders more severely regardless of whether their offense was committed after punishment for a first offense. In any event, Congress decided not to enact any condition restricting the application of the repeat offender provisions. “To include by implication any of these conditions would result in our rewriting the statute, a task not committed to the judiciary.” Raynor, 939 F.2d at 194 .

We have not found any conclusive legislative history to contradict the plain meaning of the statute and Neal has directed us to none. We address the remaining issues on appeal in a memorandum filed simultaneously with this opinion.

AFFIRMED.