United States v. Albert Miranda

Good Law
986 F.2d 1283·1993 WL 46632·38 Fed. R. Serv. 160·1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 3053·93 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1297
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitFebruary 25, 199391-10390California1,448 words

Opinion

Opinion

O'Scannlain, J.

On February 2, 1990, an indictment was issued by a grand jury charging Miranda with three counts of bank robbery pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2113 . The indictment alleged that he robbed the Bank of the West in San Francisco on September 15, 1989 (Count One); that, displaying a gun, he robbed the same bank on October 20, 1989 (Count Two); and that he robbed the Union Bank in San Francisco on October 30, 1989 (Count Three). Miranda’s trial commenced on December 20, 1990. He was convicted by a jury of counts one and two, but acquitted of count three. The district court denied his motion for a new trial and this appeal followed. We now affirm.

I

The Speedy Trial Act mandates that an indictment be dismissed if more than seventy days of unexcluded time elapsed between the indictment and the commencement of trial. Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 326 , 106 S.Ct. 1871, 1874-75 , 90 L.Ed.2d 299 (1986); 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (c)(1). The district court found much of the time between the indictment and trial to be excludable. At issue here is the court’s conclusion that a period of 106 days during which a mental competency evaluation report was under preparation should be excluded.

Under…

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