concurring:

I join in the panel’s opinion only because I am obligated to follow the panel opinion in Castillo-Villagra v. INS, 972 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir.1992).

I write separately to make clear that I believe that the Due Process question in Castillo-Villagra is one of exceptional importance and that the panel’s decision is in tension with or squarely conflicts with decisions of eight other courts of appeals, representing every other court that has considered this issue. I believe that, as a matter of procedure, the decision runs counter to the Federal Rules of Evidence and that, as a matter of constitutional law, the question was wrongly decided.

Reduced to its essence, Castillo-Villa-gra holds that prior notification to the petitioners that the Board was taking administrative notice of a government change in Nicaragua was an absolute — an absolute mandated by the Constitution — and that the Board’s failure to give prior notification violated the Due Process Clause. This draconian extension of orthodox Due Process teachings stemmed from the view that the Board’s discretionary power to grant or deny a stay of deportation affords the petitioners no protection from deportation pending a motion to reopen the proceedings to present competent rebuttal evidence.

I agree that denying an opportunity to present rebuttal evidence would amount to a Due Process deprivation, but I believe that the petitioners are protected from any action to deport them pending the motion for reopening, because the district court would have habeas jurisdiction as exemplified by Judge Fletcher’s opinion for the court in Dhangu v. INS, 812 F.2d 455 (9th Cir.1987). Accordingly, I believe that the Castillo-Villagra panel pushed Due Process teachings beyond permissible limits, determining prematurely that a constitutional deprivation has taken place; the petitioners have not been prevented from presenting rebuttal evidence before the Board, and until that denial takes place, there is no Due Process deprivation.

The holding conflicts with decisions of the Courts of Appeals of the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh and District of Columbia Circuits involving administrative notice of the Nicaraguan government change, and with decisions of the First, Third, Seventh, Eighth *1115 and Tenth circuits involving notice of government changes in Poland and Hungary.

For the purposes of my discussion I concede that there are factual differences in the change of government in Nicaragua on the one hand and in Poland and Hungary on the other hand. Solely for the purpose of conceding there is a difference in the Nicaragua cases, I will take judicial notice of the existence of accounts in leading newspapers stating that former Sandinis-tas control the Nicaraguan army and police forces. 1

It is very significant to me that, of the nine courts of appeals that have considered the use of administrative notice by the Board of Immigration Appeals to record a government change, only this court has found a Due Process deprivation.

Also significantly, the Castillo-Villagra opinion, decided July 27, 1992, failed to analyze the reasoning of our sister circuits that previously reached a contrary result in Nicaragua cases, viz., Chavez-Robles v. INS, 966 F.2d 1441 (4th Cir.1992) (unpublished opinion); Gutierrez-Rogue v. INS, 954 F.2d 769 (D.C.Cir.1992); Rivera-Cruz v. INS, 948 F.2d 962 (5th Cir.1991), reh’g denied, 954 F.2d 723 (5th Cir.1992) (table).

I.

The panel’s decision runs counter to the spirit, if not the letter, of Evidence Rule 201(e), which contains an explicit provision allowing rebuttal after judicial notice has been taken. To be sure, I recognize that this rule relates to judicial notice and not administrative notice, but to me this is a distinction without a difference. Rule 201(e) specifically provides that if judicial notice is taken of a fact, “[i]n the absence of prior notification, the request [to be heard as to the propriety of taking notice] may be made after judicial notice has been taken.” (My emphasis). A court may take judicial notice of facts without prior notification to the parties, so long as the court subsequently provides an opportunity to rebut the noticed facts, and I have not been directed to any reasoning suggesting that another rule, prudential or constitutional, should be imposed on administrative agencies. Nothing in the Castillo-Villagra opinion addresses this conflict with Rule 201(e).

II.

I now turn to the Castillo-Villagra Due Process holding. Preliminarily, I emphasize those portions of the opinion with which I am in total agreement:

My quarrel is only with the panel’s interpretation of the Due Process Clause. Before addressing this, however, it is well to understand (a) the procedures for reopening Board proceedings, and (b) the regula *1116 tory and statutory provisions governing stays of deportation.

A.

Neither the Immigration and Nationality Act nor the INS regulations implementing it expressly provides the alien with an opportunity to challenge an officially noticed fact. I believe, however, that the Due Process Clause requires that this opportunity be provided, because a hearing is not truly, meaningful if a critical issue is effectively excluded from consideration. I believe that Due Process grants these petitioners the right to challenge an officially noticed fact, to challenge with respect both to its truth and its significance. See Rivera-Cruz, 948 F.2d at 968 ; Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588, 596 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 583 , 116 L.Ed.2d 608 (1991). I am satisfied, however, that INS regulations do provide this opportunity.

An alien whose application for asylum and withholding of deportation has been rejected by the Board may petition the Board to reopen his or her case based upon new evidence.

8 C.F.R. § 3.2 provides in part:

8 C.F.R. 3.8(a) provides in part:

These procedures “provide[ ] asylum applicants with an opportunity to present the [Board] with evidence that the facts it officially noticed are incorrect or that they are true but irrelevant to their case.” Kaczmarczyk, 933 F.2d at 597 ; see also Rivera-Cruz, 948 F.2d at 968 .

B.

Proceedings in these cases usually begin with a deportation order issued by an INS district director. The alien then has several options. He or she may file an initial application for asylum or withholding of deportation or both with the INS Asylum Office by mail, 8 C.F.R. § 208.4 (a), with the district director, § 208.4(b), or with an immigration judge, § 208.4(c). Also typically for our purposes, deportation is stayed pending an appeal to the Board from the immigration judge’s denial of asylum or withholding of deportation. 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.6 and 243.4.

The deportation decision of the Board is a final order, 8 C.F.R. § 3.1 (d)(2), which may be judicially reviewed by this court. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a. The next stay goes into effect by operation of the Immigration and Nationality Act when a petition for review of the Board’s order is filed and then served on the INS. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(3). When the court of appeals grants the petition for review, the court’s action has two principal effects: It dislodges the statutory stay and reinstates the stay that was in effect during the Board’s consideration of the appeal; it also nullifies the Board’s final order and, in ordinary circumstances, reinstates the proceedings before the Board. When the court denies the petition for review, the statutory stay terminates.

I think the Castillo-Villagra panel recognized all this but expressed the fear that the petitioners were now at the exclusive mercy of the Board, which could execute or stay deportation during consideration of the motion to reopen. 8 C.F.R. § 3.8 (a). The panel further observed that the court of appeals in Kaczmarczyk presumed that the Board would exercise its discretion to stay deportation until it had ruled on the motion, but the panel concluded:

972 F.2d at 1030 .

Thus, what concerned the Castillo-Villa-gra panel was the lack of assurance that the INS would continue to stay deportation pending the presentation by the petitioners and consideration by the Board of evidence rebutting those facts that had been administratively noticed. It was this lack of a guaranteed stay pending reopening that led the court to depart from our sister circuits.

III.

What the Castillo-Villagra panel failed to recognize is that upon the return to the Board the petitioners are not at the complete mercy of the Board when it comes to the sensitive question of deportation. The petitioners have a federal court remedy to afford immediate, round-the-clock protection against any INS action that might implement deportation proceedings before a Due. Process right has been vindicated. It is a federal court remedy that would be available as soon as a Due Process claim did in fact ripen.

In particular, the Castillo-Villagra panel failed to consider the strong line of cases of this court explaining that the district court has jurisdiction to review a district director’s, an immigration judge’s or the Board’s interim discretionary decision to deny a stay of deportation. These eases are exemplified by Judge Fletcher’s opinion for the court in Dhangu v. INS, 812 F.2d 455, 459 (9th Cir.1987) (citing Williams v. INS, 795 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir.1986); Kemper v. INS, 705 F.2d 1150, 1150 (9th Cir.1983); Sotelo Mondragon v. Ilchert, 653 F.2d 1254, 1256 (9th Cir.1980)). Thus, the petitioners will not be placed in limbo. The petitioners will not be at the sole mercy of any discretionary stay order by the immigration service. Federal courthouse doors will be open to them.

A.

The Due Process Clause can be vindicated by the Board’s consideration of new evidence in a motion to reopen, and if the Board denies, the opportunity to present such evidence, a Due Process violation then occurs. Cf. Gutierrez, 954 F.2d at 773 ; Rivera-Cruz, 948 F.2d at 968-69 ; Kaczmarczyk, 933 F.2d at 597 & n. 9. It occurs because, in accordance with the Fifth Amendment, the petitioner will be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without Due Process of law.” The key word is “deprived.” For our purposes, the petitioner cannot be deprived until or unless he or she is denied the opportunity to present competent rebuttal evidence.

The petitioners here, as in Castillo-Vil-lagra, have not yet made such a request to the Board. No Board has denied them this opportunity. Therefore, no Due Process violation has taken place.

It is precisely at this point where the Castillo-Villagra panel went astray. It fouhd a deprivation when no deprivation existed. And no court, federal or state, high or low, may properly find a Due Process violation unless it first finds that someone has been “deprived.”

Nor is it a proper analogy to suggest that the taking of administrative notice by the Board is tantamount to a district court’s dismissal of an action for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R.Civ.P. This argument confuses the fundamental, if not rudimentary, distinction between issues of fact and law. The administratively noticed fact may be refuted by presenting competent rebuttal evidence, whether in the same hearing or in a subsequent motion to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 . In a Rule 12(b)(6) disposition, however, all facts are assumed to be true, but insufficient as a matter of law.

An argument based on the dismissal-of-a-claim analogy may succeed only if one makes a further assumption — which I refuse to make — that a petitioner is not permitted to rebut the noticed fact in a Section 3.2 hearing. The regulation provides that the motion shall not be granted unless the “evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.”

*1118 Obviously, the evidence of the Sandinis-tas’ continued power is material, but it was not available or presented to the Board in this case, because of the chronology of events. The appeal petition to the Board was filed July 2, 1986, and the petitioners filed their brief November 1, 1987. No hearing was requested by the petitioners for the reception of additional evidence. The Board held the appeal in abeyance for almost three years, and in the meanwhile, the Chamorro government came to power on April 25, 1990. The Board affirmed the immigration judge’s decision on September 28, 1990.

Moreover, the very nature of the rebuttal information — that subsequent to the Board’s decision in 1990, the Sandinistas continued to control the Nicaraguan police and army — is evidence that “was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” The very nature of the present contention, to be sure, a most compelling, effective and formidable one, is that today, in 1993, the Sandinistas still control the police and military, see supra note 1, and the petitioners have a justified fear of persecution. In my view, not only may this rebuttal evidence be presented at a Section 3.2 hearing, but a refusal of the Board to consider it would be the action that triggers a Due Process deprivation.

B.

But I can understand what motivated the Castillo-Villagra panel to stretch orthodox Due Process teachings. It was classic result-oriented jurisprudence designed to protect the petitioners from deportation during the period when the Board would consider competent evidence to rebut the administratively noticed facts.

Such a motivation is admirable, especially in view of the tragic circumstances to which many petitioners appearing before this court were exposed during the period of the Sandinista dictatorship. But in the law, the desired result must be both principled and congruent with and not antagonistic to valid and binding rules of the system. Professor Kent Greenawalt reminds us:

Similarly, Professor Herbert Wechsler taught judges that “A decision may, in short, be wholly principled and wrong.... [I]t cannot be unprincipled and right.” 3

To be sure, this is valuable advice for all phases of appellate adjudication, but it is especially important in matters of constitutional law. In these cases, our watchwords must always be those of Chief Justice Marshall: “In considering this question, then, we must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding.” 4

Adherence to the tenet of consistency keeps the march of the law at a measured cadence. The point riders can go just so far; the outriders must keep close to the flanks; and the drags must not fall too far behind. In deciding questions of constitutional law, no matter how noble our motivation or lofty the desired consequence, our decisions must not be inconsistent with established rules. Point riders, outriders and drags must not drift too far away from those legal precepts that are theirs to protect.

In Castillo-Villagra , the panel cast tenets of consistency and coherence aside in inventing a new meaning for Due Process deprivation, a meaning that is both unprincipled and inconsistent with established Due Process Clause teachings.

*1119 Here, too, even if the panel’s analysis had been congruent with principled precepts, the panel failed to recognize the interplay of habeas jurisdiction in the federal district courts in INS cases, see Dhangu, 812 F.2d 455 , and the ripening of a Due Process deprivation claim if the INS attempted to deport precipitously without providing the petitioners with an opportunity to move for reopening. A denial of the discretionary stay could prevent the petitioners from making such a presentation. 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (“A motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider shall not be made by or in behalf of a person who is the subject of deportation proceedings subsequent to his departure from the United States”). This denial would be the Due Process deprivation that would immediately vest jurisdiction in the district court through habeas review. Dhangu, 812 F.2d at 459 . 5

Alternatively, if the refusal of a discretionary stay is considered “incident” to proceedings on a motion to reopen properly before this court, the denial of a discretionary stay can be reviewed by this court. Id. at 459 n. 6 (citing Reyes v. INS, 571 F.2d 505 (9th Cir.1978)).

C.

Thus, in my view, the Castillo-Villagra panel jumped the gun. It found a Due Process violation even though the petitioners in that case, as in the one before us, were not finally deprived of an opportunity to rebut the noticed facts.

Although “[tjhere is no constitutional right to political asylum itself,” it is established that—

Maldonado-Perez v. INS, 865 F.2d 328, 332-33 (D.C.Cir.1989) (citation omitted); cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 , 96 S.Ct. 893, 901 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (“The fundamental requirement of Due Process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner”) (internal quotation marks omitted). It follows that the Board may not use its undoubted authority to take official notice of a change in a government abroad, see, e.g., Rivera-Cruz v. INS, 948 F.2d 962, 966 (5th Cir.1991); Janusiak v. INS, 947 F.2d 46 , 48 & n. 1 (3d Cir.1991); Kapcia v. INS, 944 F.2d 702, 705 (10th Cir.1991); Kubon v. INS, 913 F.2d 386, 388 (7th Cir.1990), in such a way as to deny an applicant for asylum her Due Process right to a meaningful hearing. Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir.1991).

I would hold that the Board’s taking notice of the change of Nicaraguan government accords with the long-standing tradition of judicial notice and administrative notice. The Board also was permitted to draw the inference that the new coalition government would not persecute those who had fled the Sandinista regime. This is a permissible inference that any fact-finder may draw. It is not a compellable inference, however, and could disappear in the presence of competent rebuttal evidence showing that Sandinistas are still able to persecute in official acts.

*1120 I would hold that the Due Process Clause confers upon the petitioners the right to rebut this permissible inference and that the Board’s denial of that opportunity violates Due Process; only when the Board denies a meaningful opportunity to present competent rebuttal evidence does a Due Process violation occur. That denial has not taken place as yet in this case. Unless and until it does, the allegation of a constitutional deprivation is completely premature.

D.

This was the apparent motivation of our sister circuits in rejecting challenges after the Board took administrative notice of government changes in Poland and Nicaragua.

As to Nicaragua, see Rhoa-Zamora v. INS, 971 F.2d 26 , 34 (7th Cir.1992) (Board took administrative notice of change of government without giving advance notification to petitioner; availability of proceedings to reopen or. reconsider adequately protected petitioner’s Due Process rights), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 2331 , — L.Ed.2d- (1993); Chavez-Robles v. INS, 966 F.2d 1441 (4th Cir.1992) (unpublished disposition; text in WESTLAW) (noticed facts provided sufficient grounds for denying petition for. review, but without prejudice to petitioner’s right to file motion to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 3.8 ); Rivera-Cruz v. INS, 948 F.2d 962, 967, 968-69 (5th Cir.1991) (Board properly took notice of change of government; availability of motion to reopen and subsequent judicial review of denial of motion ensured that Board would not deprive petitioner of fair hearing); Gutierrez-Rogue v. INS, 954 F.2d 769, 773 (D.C.Cir.1992) (petitioner appears to be correct in arguing that Due Process guarantees right to contest noticed facts, but Due Process claim is premature, because petitioner did not file motion to reopen). 6

IV.

For reasons known only to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, no petition for panel rehearing and no suggestion for rehearing en banc were filed in that case, even though its decision — that the Due Process Clause prevents the Board of Immigration Appeals from taking administrative notice of the Nicaragua government change without advance notification to the petitioners — conflicts with every other court of appeals that has discussed the issue.

But the status of constitutional law should not be at the whim of lawyers for a single administrative agency. The legal precept underlying Castillo-Villagra is not limited to INS administrative law. The decision has powerful precedential authority. It was not an airline super-saver excursion ticket good for this day and flight only.

Because the panel bottomed its decision on constitutional law, it has a serious potential as a precedent — at least in this judicial circuit — to disturb the long-standing, recognized practice of federal agencies to take administrative notice of facts, and to draw inferences from those facts, a practice authorized by Congress and a host of federal regulations.

I feel it necessary to repeat that although INS lawyers decided not to ask for en banc reconsideration or to file a petition for certiorari, this does not mean that Castillo-Villagra is an interpretation of immi *1121 gration law only; it is a flat, if not imperial, statement of constitutional law.

First, it has a potential effect on all agencies regulated by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) at least in this judicial circuit. 7 The taking of official notice is authorized by the APA, but the Act provides:

5 U.S.C. § 556 (e).

This statutory provision not only makes sense and comports with fairness, but it meets the orthodox precepts of Due Process: It provides those who are affected an opportunity, “on timely request,” to present competent evidence rebutting the noticed facts. Applying the Castillo-Villa-gra test requiring advance notification, obviously this portion of the APA will not pass constitutional muster. This is strong medicine. And the ramifications could be widespread.

Administrative notice may be taken by many federal agencies under specific statutory and regulatory authority. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.64 (Merit Systems Protection Board); 5 C.F.R. § 2423.19 (Federal Labor Relations Authority); 9 C.F.R. § 202.120 (proceedings under Packers and Stockyards Act, 7 U.S.C. § 181 et seq.); 10 C.F.R. § 13.18 (civil fraud proceedings before Nuclear Regulatory Commission); 12 C.F.R. § 19.36 (Treasury regulations governing national banks); 13 C.F.R. § 142.18 (civil fraud proceedings before Small Business Administration). Conceivably, these regulations are now out the constitutional window — at least in this, the largest of the federal judicial circuits — because the statutes, regulations and agency practice do not provide for advance notification that the agency will be taking administrative notice of certain facts.

Moreover, other agencies may be affected. See, e.g., ACEMLA v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 763 F.2d 101, 109 (2d Cir.1985) (dicta) (copyright agency might be able to take administrative notice that certain copyrighted musical works were being performed based on works’ dominant position in industry); NLRB v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Local 338, 531 F.2d 1162 , 1165-66 (2d Cir.1976) (Board is permitted to take official notice of “its expert knowledge of labor relations and ... its ‘appraisal of normal conditions about industrial establishments,’ [citation omitted], as well as ... common experience and common sense,” but Administrative Procedure Act does not permit official notice “to short-circuit the requirements of a fair hearing. It may, for example, be unfair under certain circumstances for the Board to draw an inference based in part upon its general knowledge of the labor field without giving the party a chance to introduce specific facts tending to rebut or explain away the inference.”); McLamore v. Weinberger, 538 F.2d 572, 574-75 (4th Cir.1976) (Secretary is permitted to use South Carolina Job Guide to take administrative notice of existence of jobs that Social Security claimant could perform).

Nor may it be effectively argued that INS cases are sui generis and lack the capacity to propagate precedents for other administrative agencies. Precepts of logic 8 and case law demonstrate that INS cases can be and are utilized to support decisions in administrative law matters involving the APA. Thus, in Union Electric Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 890 F.2d 1193 (D.C.Cir.1989), the *1122 court cites INS precedent to support the proposition that administrative notice is broader than judicial notice. Id. at 1202 . In addition, the court held that if an administrative agency provides the opportunity for a rehearing after it has administratively noticed facts and the agency “respond[s] to it reasonably, the Commission satisfie[s] [5 U.S.C.] § 556(e) on this point.” Id. at 1203. Moreover, because the mechanism for rehearing satisfied the statute, no Due Process violation ripened. Id. at 1202.

V.

This, too, must be said. Although my difference with the Castillo-Villagra panel may appear to be narrow, and although we would guarantee the petitioners the opportunity of presenting rebuttal evidence to the Board, a wide jurisprudential chasm separates us. I believe that we should return to the status quo ante in two important areas of the law affected by its decision: administrative or judicial notice, and the ripening of Due Process claims.

Thus, I reach the same result as each of our sister circuits. With them I agree that the motion to present rebuttal evidence implicates a right assured by the Due Process Clause and must be considered in good faith by the Board. Kaczmarczyk, 933 F.2d at 597 n. 34, quoted in Rhoa-Zamora, 971 F.2d at 36. With them, I would “admonish the Board to consider petitioner's motion in that light.” Id.

But I go one step further. I remind the Board that the district courthouse doors would swing wide open for habeas relief if suddenly — by whim, accident, chance or predetermination — someone in the immigration service would take upon himself or herself to implement deportation proceedings at the very same time the petitioners are attempting to vindicate a Due Process right before the Board.

Accordingly, I concur in the judgment in this case, but I do so only because this panel is bound by the prior panel decision.

. Just-Published Law Strengthens Sandinista Military, S.F. Chron., Sept. 18, 1990, at -, reprinted in Petr. Br. app.; Managua Seeks Quick Answer in Death, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1991, at 3, reprinted in id.

. Kent Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 Colum.L.Rev. 982, 990 (1978).

. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 , 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819).

. The restriction in 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 has been interpreted to apply only to one who has departed under lawful procedures. Wiedersperg v. INS, 896 F.2d 1179, 1180-81 (9th Cir.1990) (restriction does not apply to alien outside United States who files petition to reopen deportation proceedings that were based on conviction later vacated) (citing Mendez v. INS, 563 F.2d 956, 958-59 (9th Cir.1977) (rejecting INS’s "contention that its decisions are immune from judicial review when the alien is physically out of the country — without regard to the manner in which this 'departure' was accomplished....”)); see also United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 837-38 , 107 S.Ct. 2148, 2154-55 , 95 L.Ed.2d 772 (1987) (alien deported on basis of constitutionally defective proceedings must be permitted to challenge deportation in subsequent prosecution for illegally reentering United States). It would seem that if one were deported under constitutionally infirm procedures in violation of one's due process rights, one would nevertheless have the right to federal habeas relief. Under such circumstances, the applicant should be permitted to return from Nicaragua to the federal court under a State Department certificate of identity to vindicate constitutional rights. 8 U.S.C. § 1503 (b).

. As to Poland, see Tokarska v. INS, 978 F.2d 1 , 1-2 (1st Cir.1992) (per curiam) (Board took notice that Solidarity is now part of coalition government in Poland, so petitioner could not fear persecution for membership in Solidarity); see also Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588, 596-97 (7th Cir.1991) (due process requires that petitioners be permitted opportunity to rebut officially noticed- facts, but existing procedures under 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 adequately protect this right); Kapcia v. INS, 944 F.2d 702, 705-06 (10th Cir.1991) (no due process deprivation when immigration judge took notice of change of government at hearing, and petitioners knew of this issue when they appealed to Board); Wojcik v. INS, 951 F.2d 172 (8th Cir.1991) (per curiam) (Board properly took administrative notice of change of government; citing Kaczmarczyk); Janusiak v. INS, 947 F.2d 46 , 48 n. 1 (3d Cir.1991) (Board properly took administrative notice of change of government); Kubon v. INS, 913 F.2d 386, 388 (7th Cir.1990) (same). See also Baka v. INS, 963 F.2d 1376, 1379 (10th Cir.1992) (per curiam) (Board properly took administrative notice of change of government in Hungary; citing Kaczmarczyk).

. To be sure, the Castillo-Villagra panel would permit administrative notice of certain facts without advance notification: "It is not necessary to warn that administrative notice will be taken of the fact that water runs downhill." 972 F.2d at 1028 .

. Logicians teach us that the acceptability of an analogy will vary proportionately with the number of circumstances that have been analyzed, will depend upon the number of positive resemblances (similarities) and negative resemblances (dissimilarities) and will be influenced by the relevance of the purported analogies. An argument based on a single relevant analogy connected with a single instance will be more cogent than one which points out a dozen irrelevant considerations. See, e.g., Irving M. Copi, Introduction to Logic 411, 414 (7th ed. 1982).