United States v. David Aguirre

On Remand from the Supreme Court of the United States.

This case was remanded to us for further consideration in light of Doggett v. United States, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 2686 , 120 L.Ed.2d 620 (1992). In our earlier disposition, we held there was no violation of defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and affirmed the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment. Our earlier decision concluded that the district court applied the proper legal standard, the test set out in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), 1 and that its underlying factual findings were not clearly erroneous. Following Barker , we counted factor (4), prejudice from the delay, against Aguirre because he didn’t show actual prejudice.

We must revisit our decision because Dog-gett modified the Barker test in one material respect: Under Doggett, factor (4) can weigh in the defendant’s favor even without a showing of actual prejudice. The Court observed that “excessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify,” — U.S. at-, 112 S.Ct. at 2693 , and held that, in…

dissenting:

I believe the extraordinary and unjustified five-year delay between Aguirre’s indictment and trial violated the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a speedy trial; therefore, I would reverse the conviction.

I

Aguirre was indicted in the Central District of California on October 27, 1983. At that time, Aguirre was working in Europe, but his family continued to live in Los Ange-les. Sometime before the indictment was filed, Aguirre learned of the need for a “court appearance.” On October 24, 1983, three days before the indictment was filed, Aguirre enlisted the aid of the United States Embassy in London to request additional time to appear in court. Aguirre received no response to this request.

At that time, Aguirre could not have known that charges were pending against him because the indictment had not yet been returned. Furthermore, he could not have known that the indictment was about to be returned because grand jury proceedings are confidential.

About a week later, Aguirre returned to the United States. He settled in Arizona, where he lived and worked under his true identity. He secured employment with the Arizona Department of Revenue, which required that he obtain…

994 F.2d 1454 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David AGUIRRE, Defendant-Appellant. No. 89-50265. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. June 7, 1993. Mary F. Gibbons, North Hollywood, CA, for defendant-appellant. Robert L. Brosio, Stefan D. Stein, Asst. U.S. Attys., Los Angeles, CA, for plaintiff-appellee. OPINION On Remand from the Supreme Court of the United States. Before: PREGERSON, BEEZER and KOZINSKI, Circuit Judges. KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge: 1 This case was remanded to us for further consideration in light of Doggett v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 2686 , 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992). In our earlier disposition, we held there was no violation of defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and affirmed the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment. Our earlier decision concluded that the district court applied the proper legal standard, the test set out in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), 1 and that its underlying factual findings were not clearly erroneous. Following Barker, we counted factor (4), prejudice from the delay, against Aguirre because he didn't show actual prejudice.…