MEMORANDUM

Según Waldron appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a search of his vehicle, a black H2 Hummer. Following the denial of his motion, Waldron entered a conditional guilty plea to possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a)(1) and (b)(1)(A), but reserved the right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. We affirm.

“Under the automobile exception ... police may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle if there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime.” United States v. Brooks, 610 F.3d 1186,1193 (9th Cir.2010). “Probable cause to search is evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 1193-94 (quoting United States v. Pinela-Hernandez, 262 F.3d 974, 978 (9th Cir.2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The investigating agents drew upon multiple sources to establish probable cause to search Waldron’s vehicle. They had information from a reliable confidential informant that the Hummer contained contraband. See United States v. Elliott, 322 F.3d 710, 715-16 (9th Cir.2003). The information was corroborated by both innocent and suspicious circumstances indicating the presence of contraband. The agents ran a trained narcotics dog around the exterior of the Hummer before searching the vehicle, and the dog gave a positive alert — indicating that it smelled narcotics. See United States v. Cedano-Arellano, 332 F.3d 568, 573 (9th Cir.2003).

Based on the totality of the circumstances — the corroborated confidential informant, the dog alert, and Waldron’s suspicious behavior — the district court correctly found that there was probable cause to believe that Waldron’s Hummer contained evidence of drug trafficking. See Brooks, 610 F.3d at 1193-94 .

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.