Maronyan

Opinion by Judge REINHARDT; Dissent by Judge N.R. SMITH.

OPINION

Mariam Maronyan brought suit against Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A. Inc. when the new car that she leased developed mechanical problems during the warranty period and Toyota failed to repair them to her satisfaction. In addition to several California state law claims, she alleged breach of warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (“MMWA”). The district court granted Toyota’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that Maronyan did not before filing suit in civil court pursue her claims through the California Dispute Settlement Program (“CDSP”) that Toyota maintained and specified in its warranty.

Maronyan appeals. She argues that her failure initially to resort to the CDSP provides Toyota an affirmative defense to her warranty claims under the MMWA, but does not defeat subject matter jurisdiction. We review de novo whether the district court properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. BNSF Ry. Co. v. O’Dea, 572 F.3d 785, 787 (9th Cir.2009). Neither party disputes that § 2310(a) of the MMWA imposes a prior-resort requirement on prospective consumer claimants seeking…

dissenting:

The Supreme Court recently explained in Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki that “Congress is free to attach the conditions that go with the jurisdictional label to a[n exhaustion] rule that we would prefer to call a claim-processing rule.” — U.S. —, 131 S.Ct. 1197 , 1203, 179 L.Ed.2d 159 (2011) (emphasis added). Because Congress incorporated the exhaustion requirement of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq. (“MMWA”) into the statute’s jurisdiction-granting provisions, we must defer to Congress’s treatment of this provision as jurisdictional. See Henderson, 181 S.Ct. at 1203. Therefore, I must dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the MMWA’s exhaustion provision is merely procedural.

*1044 Additionally, the majority errs in declining to address a critical question of law properly raised on appeal — whether courts (rather than the Federal Trade Commission) should decide challenges to a “Mechanism’s” 1 compliance with federal regulations. Under the MMWA, courts no longer have authority to decide compliance issues, because Congress vested authority to decide those issues in the first instance with the FTC. On the other hand, even if the…

Before: D.W. NELSON, STEPHEN REINHARDT, and N. RANDY SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge REINHARDT; Dissent by Judge N.R. SMITH.

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:

Mariam Maronyan brought suit against Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A. Inc. when the new car that she leased developed mechanical problems during the warranty period and Toyota failed to repair them to her satisfaction. In addition to several California state law claims, she alleged breach of warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ("MMWA"). The district court granted Toyota's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that Maronyan did not before filing suit in civil court pursue her claims through the California Dispute Settlement Program ("CDSP") that Toyota maintained and specified in its warranty.

Maronyan appeals. She argues that her failure initially to resort to the CDSP provides Toyota an affirmative defense to her warranty claims under the MMWA, but does not defeat subject matter jurisdiction. We review de novo whether the district court properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. BNSF Ry. Co. v. O'Dea, 572 F.3d 785, 787 (9th Cir.2009). Neither party disputes that §…