Miller v. City of Los Angeles

dissenting:

The defense attorney violated the district court’s in limine order. Everyone who was in the courtroom that day agreed with this conclusion: the district court, the plaintiffs attorney, the defendant, and even the defense attorney himself. Only the majority, perched high in its appellate tower, claims an ability to discern from the cold trial transcript that there was no such violation. The majority’s holding flouts the deferential standard of review established by United States v. Hinkson, which requires us to uphold the district court’s determination unless it was “illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that may be drawn from facts in the record.” 585 F.3d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir.2009) (en banc). Of course, the majority claims that it is not striking down the district court’s ruling that Arias violated the in limine order, but only invalidating the district court’s imposition of sanctions on the ground that there was no violation of the order at all. But such casuistry does nothing more than skirt the deference required by Hinkson.

I

Our cases make clear that the district court is in a better position to determine whether a party engaged in…

Opinion by Chief Judge KOZINSKI; Dissent by Judge IKUTA.

*1026 OPINION

This is a strange case. Its resolution hinges on the absence, as a factual matter, of something we must accept as a legal matter. There are unlikely to be many more like it, so this opinion’s precedential value is probably limited. We nevertheless publish pursuant to General Order 4.3. While we’re at it, we offer some advice to lawyers: Don’t apologize unless you’re sure you did something wrong. And there’s also a lesson for district judges: Don’t accept too readily lawyers’ confessions of error or rely on your own memory of what happened. Trials are complicated and we sometimes misremember details. That’s why we have transcripts.

Facts

This case arises from a lawsuit filed by Philip Miller’s family against the City of Los Angeles, its police department, police chief and Sergeant Mata. Philip died after Mata shot him, and plaintiffs claimed that Mata was not justified in using deadly force. The district court issued an in limine order precluding defendants from arguing that the decedent was armed when he was shot. In his summation, defense counsel Richard Arias argued that Mata thought Miller failed to…

John Burton (argued), Law Offices of John Burton, Pasadena, CA, for appellee Georgia Miller, et al.

Elbie Hickambottom, Jr., Gronemeier & Associates, P.C., Eagle Rock, CA, for appellee Georgia Miller, et al.

Before: ALEX KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, SANDRA S. IKUTA, Circuit Judge and LAWRENCE L. PIERSOL, District Judge. [*]

Opinion by Chief Judge KOZINSKI; Dissent by Judge IKUTA.

KOZINSKI, Chief Judge:

This is a strange case. Its resolution hinges on the absence, as a factual matter, of something we must accept as a legal matter. There are unlikely to be many more like it, so this opinion's precedential value is probably limited. We nevertheless publish pursuant to General Order 4.3. While we're at it, we offer some advice to lawyers: Don't apologize unless you're sure you did something wrong. And there's also a lesson for district judges: Don't accept too readily lawyers' confessions of error or rely on your own memory of what happened. Trials are complicated and we sometimes misremember details. That's why we have transcripts.

This case arises from a lawsuit filed by Philip Miller's family against the City of Los Angeles, its police department, police chief and Sergeant Mata.…