William Whitsitt v. George Lytle

MEMORANDUM

William J. Whitsitt appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims arising from a traffic stop. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo. Albertson’s, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 157 F.3d 758 , 760 n. 2 (9th Cir.1998). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Shanks v. Dressel, 540 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir.2008). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claims concerning the traffic stop because Whitsitt failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants had reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. See United States v. Hartz, 458 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir.2006) (“A police-initiated traffic stop is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if the police stop the vehicle because of a ‘reasonable suspicion’ that the vehicle’s occupants have broken a law.” (citation omitted)).

Contrary to Whitsitt’s contention, the magistrate judge had authority to enter summary judgment because the parties consented to his authority to hear the case and enter judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 636…