22:I[98912,["/_next/static/chunks/0asocxi83kb~5.js","/_next/static/chunks/0n4z.7yu76je-.js","/_next/static/chunks/0eyt_ou8dj52g.js","/_next/static/chunks/01bcia3bjqt9z.js","/_next/static/chunks/15egrlmmf_yst.js"],"CaseDetailGate"] 23:T473,MEMORANDUM George Cramer contends that the evidence presented at his trial was insufficient to convict him of three counts of willfully allowing his livestock to graze, without a permit, on lands administered by the Bureau of Land Management. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 4140.1 (b)(l)(i), 4170.2-1. We disagree. Considered in the light most favorable to the United States, the evidence presented at trial was adequate to allow a rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of each count of unlawful grazing beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc). Cramer also contends that the magistrate judge erred by admitting evidence of prior instances of uncharged grazing. Again, we disagree. That evidence was admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), and the magistrate judge did not err in concluding that the United States gave Cramer adequate pretrial notice of the evidence. See United States v. Beckman, 298 F.3d 788, 794 (9th Cir.2002). AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.24:T4a0,

MEMORANDUM

George Cramer contends that the evidence presented at his trial was insufficient to convict him of three counts of willfully allowing his livestock to graze, without a permit, on lands administered by the Bureau of Land Management. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 4140.1 (b)(l)(i), 4170.2-1. We disagree. Considered in the light most favorable to the United States, the evidence presented at trial was adequate to allow a rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of each count of unlawful grazing beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc).

Cramer also contends that the magistrate judge erred by admitting evidence of prior instances of uncharged grazing. Again, we disagree. That evidence was admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), and the magistrate judge did not err in concluding that the United States gave Cramer adequate pretrial notice of the evidence. See United States v. Beckman, 298 F.3d 788, 794 (9th Cir.2002).

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.