22:I[98912,["/_next/static/chunks/0asocxi83kb~5.js","/_next/static/chunks/0n4z.7yu76je-.js","/_next/static/chunks/0eyt_ou8dj52g.js","/_next/static/chunks/01bcia3bjqt9z.js","/_next/static/chunks/15egrlmmf_yst.js"],"CaseDetailGate"] 23:T520,MEMORANDUM Appellant Skyline Steel, LLC, (Skyline) challenges the district court’s denial of Skyline’s motion to set aside entry of default and default judgment. Our recent precedent noted the importance of deciding cases on the merits and established that denial of relief from a default judgment is appropriate only in “extreme circumstances.” Uni ted States v. Signed Personal Check No. 730 of Yubran S. Mesle (M esle), 615 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010) (describing default judgment as “a drastic step appropriate only in extreme circumstances ...” and noting that “[d]ue to the policy of favoring judgments on the merits, a glaring abuse of discretion is not required for reversal of a court’s refusal to relieve a party of the harsh sanction of default”) (citation omitted). Mesle was decided after the district court’s decision in this case, and the district court did not have the benefit of our reasoning as expressed in Mesle. Because we are persuaded that Mesle compels a different outcome, we reverse the district court’s denial of Skyline’s motion to set aside entry of default and default judgment and remand for further proceedings. REVERSED AND REMANDED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.24:T54d,

MEMORANDUM

Appellant Skyline Steel, LLC, (Skyline) challenges the district court’s denial of Skyline’s motion to set aside entry of default and default judgment. Our recent precedent noted the importance of deciding cases on the merits and established that denial of relief from a default judgment is appropriate only in “extreme circumstances.” Uni ted States v. Signed Personal Check No. 730 of Yubran S. Mesle (M esle), 615 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010) (describing default judgment as “a drastic step appropriate only in extreme circumstances ...” and noting that “[d]ue to the policy of favoring judgments on the merits, a glaring abuse of discretion is not required for reversal of a court’s refusal to relieve a party of the harsh sanction of default”) (citation omitted). Mesle was decided after the district court’s decision in this case, and the district court did not have the benefit of our reasoning as expressed in Mesle.

Because we are persuaded that Mesle compels a different outcome, we reverse the district court’s denial of Skyline’s motion to set aside entry of default and default judgment and remand for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.