Patricia Sexton v. Michael Astrue

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff-Appellant Patricia Ann Sexton (“Sexton”) appeals the denial of her request for attorney’s fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). She contends that the government’s “position” was not “substantially justified.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (d)(1)(A). There is no dispute that Sexton is a “prevailing party” for purposes of the EAJA.

“Substantially justified means justified in substance or in the main — that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 , 108 S.Ct. 2541 , 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). In reviewing a district court’s denial of EAJA fees in a case where, as here, the district court reversed the decision of an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on account of procedural errors, the relevant question is not whether the government’s position on the merits of the plaintiffs claim was substantially justified but, rather, “whether the government’s decision to defend on appeal the procedural errors committed by the ALJ was substantially justified.” Shafer v. Astrue, 518 F.3d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir.2008).

“To reject the opinion of a treating physician which…