Florez

*1180 Defendant John Paul Florez is currently serving a "Three Strikes" sentence. Following the passage of Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act, he filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.126. 1 Although he was eligible to be resentenced based on his current and past offenses, the trial court exercised its discretion to find that resentencing him "would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety" (§ 1170.126, subd. (f)) and denied his petition. Defendant appealed. For the *1181 reasons set forth below we find no merit in any of defendant's arguments on appeal and affirm the order denying his petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 1998, police officers saw defendant urinating behind a convenience store in San Jose. Officers believed defendant dropped something on the ground. Shortly thereafter, officers discovered a small bag containing 0.19 grams of cocaine near where defendant had been standing. Officers also determined that defendant was under the influence of opiates and cocaine.

In 1999, defendant pleaded guilty to a felony for possession of a cocaine base and a misdemeanor for being under the influence. He also admitted he…

I. Introduction

My esteemed colleagues join a number of courts in refusing to apply Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (c)(§-1170.18(c)), according to its plain meaning. To the best of my knowledge, only one of those decisions is currently citable. ( People v. Esparza (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 726 , 734-737, 195 Cal.Rptr.3d 597 ; see Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.1115(a), 8.1105(e)(1).) Although I joined in that decision, I have concluded on further reflection that I erred in doing so, as I believe my colleagues continue to err here. All of these cases should be governed by the fundamental principle that statutes possessing a plain meaning must be given effect in accordance with that meaning. None of the recognized exceptions to this rule is present. Least of all can the language at issue here be credibly said to involve a "drafting error." The real rationale for refusing to enforce the statute according to its terms is that the effect of the statute's plain meaning was not pointed out in the ballot pamphlet to the voters who adopted it. I have concluded that for a court to disregard plain statutory language on such a ground is obnoxious to the constitutional separation of…