K.R.

*298 In 1978, this court established a basic background rule applicable to plea negotiations in criminal cases, holding that "[a]s a general principle ... whenever a judge accepts a plea bargain and retains sentencing discretion under the agreement, an implied term of the bargain is that sentence will be imposed by that judge." ( People v. Arbuckle (1978) 22 Cal.3d 749 , 756-757, 150 Cal.Rptr. 778 , 587 P.2d 220 ( Arbuckle ).) We later found the same rule applied to pleas in juvenile court. ( In re Mark L. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 171 , 177, 193 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 666 P.2d 22 ( Mark L. ).) In the ensuing years, some intermediate appellate courts have perceived some leeway in the Arbuckle rule, and declined to recognize a right to the same judge at sentencing unless the record contained sufficient evidence that the defendant subjectively intended, as a condition of his or her plea, that the judge who accepted the plea would also pronounce sentence. (See, e.g., People v. Horn (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 701 , 707-708, 261 Cal.Rptr. 814 .) The Court of Appeal below joined in this view, denying petitioner K.R.'s petition for a writ of mandate because he "failed to show that he entered into the plea…