Hutcheson

*941 This case turns on whether an attorney-in-fact made a "health care decision" by admitting her principal to a residential care facility for the elderly and, in the process, agreeing to an arbitration clause. If she did, as the trial court found, she acted outside the scope of her authority under the power of attorney, and the arbitration clause this appeal seeks to enforce is void.

To answer this question, we must define the scope of two statutes, the Power of Attorney Law ( Prob. Code, § 4000 et seq. (PAL)), and the Health Care Decisions Law ( Prob. Code, § 4600 et seq. (HCDL)), in light of the care a residential care facility for the elderly agreed to provide, and actually provided, in this instance ( Health & Saf. Code, § 1569 et seq. ), and parse the authority of two of the principal's relatives, one holding a power of attorney under the PAL and one holding a power of attorney under the HCDL.

We conclude admission of decedent to the residential care facility for the elderly in this instance was a health care decision, and the attorney-in-fact who admitted her, acting under the PAL, was not authorized to make health care decisions on behalf of the principal.

As a result…