Suarez

*1276 INTRODUCTION

An information filed in the Merced County Superior Court charged Ryan Osmen Suarez with the murder of John Cordero. ( Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) The information further alleged Suarez (1) personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death ( id ., § 12022.53, subd. (d)); (2) personally used a firearm ( id ., § 12022.5) within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code 1 section 707, subdivision (d)(2)(B) ; and (3) committed the offense for the benefit of, or in association with, a criminal street gang ( Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b) ). Although Suarez committed the offense when he was 15 years old, he was tried as an adult in criminal court. The victim was 15 years old as well.

A jury convicted Suarez of first degree murder and found the enhancement allegations true. The court sentenced Suarez to an aggregate, unstayed term of 50 years to life in state prison. Suarez now appeals his conviction and sentence, making a series of arguments.

Suarez claims the evidence was insufficient for a reasonable jury to find the elements of deliberation and premeditation, required for a conviction of first degree murder, were proven…

I concur with the majority in sections I. through VII. and IX., which comprise the unpublished portion of this opinion. I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision that Proposition 57 applies prospectively only and does not extend to cases such as Suarez's, which were pending final *461 judgment on its effective date. Although there is a general presumption that new laws apply prospectively, Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282 , 287, 279 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 807 P.2d 434 , I conclude that Proposition 57 is subject to the exception to that presumption articulated in In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 , 48 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 408 P.2d 948 ( Estrada ).

Specifically, Estrada held: "When the Legislature has amended a statute to reduce the punishment for a particular criminal offense, we will assume, absent evidence to the contrary, that the Legislature intended the amended statute to apply to all defendants whose judgments are not yet final on the statute's operative date." ( People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314 , 323, 142 Cal.Rptr.3d 824 , 278 P.3d 1182 , fn. omitted ( Brown ).) Brown explained that Estrada "articulate[d] the reasonable presumption that a legislative act…