Joseph

*383 The jury found defendant and appellant Michael Joseph guilty of two counts of second degree robbery ( Pen. Code, § 211 [counts 1 & 2] ) 1 and one count of perjury by declaration (§ 118, subd. (a) [count 3] ).

Joseph was sentenced to seven years in state prison, consisting of the upper term of five years in count 1, plus one year each in counts 2 and 3 (one third of the middle term).

Joseph contends that there is insufficient evidence to support his robbery conviction because the prosecution failed to demonstrate the robbery was accomplished using force.

In the opening brief, Joseph also contended he was incorrectly charged with perjury under section 118, subdivision (a), a felony, when he should have been charged with falsely reporting a crime to police under section 148.5, subdivision (a), a misdemeanor. Following our review of the record, we requested that the parties file supplemental briefing to address: (1) whether Vehicle Code section 10501, subdivision (a) preempts section 148.5, subdivision (a), or section 118, subdivision (a); and (2) the impact of a recent Court of Appeal decision in that has since been depublished. Joseph now contends that Vehicle Code section…

I concur in the majority's analysis of defendant Michael Joseph's (defendant's) claim that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for robbery. I write separately to outline why I agree the other claim defendant raises-that the rule espoused in In re Williamson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 651 , 276 P.2d 593 ( Williamson ) should have barred his prosecution for felony perjury under Penal Code section 118 -must be rejected.

As the majority correctly explains, the Williamson rule is a rule of statutory interpretation. ( People v. Walker (2002) 29 Cal.4th 577 , 586, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 75 , 59 P.3d 150 ["The rule is not one of constitutional or statutory mandate, but serves as an aid to judicial interpretation when two statutes conflict"].) In theory, the rule's counsel is straightforward and sensible: "[I]f a general statute includes the same conduct as a special statute, the court infers that the Legislature intended that conduct to be prosecuted exclusively under the special statute." ( People v. Murphy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 81 , 86, 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 78 , 253 P.3d 1216 ( Murphy ).) As the reasoning goes, " '[t]he fact that the Legislature has enacted a specific statute covering much…