Wright

People v. Wright

Good Law
249 Cal. Rptr. 3d 410·37 Cal. App. 5th 120
Court of Appeal of CaliforniaJuly 2, 2019C082729California15,872 words

Opinion

Lead Opinion

Hull, J.

*125 Defendant Christopher Wright admitted a felony violation of Penal Code section 530.5, subdivision (c)(3), acquiring personal identifying information with intent to defraud, in relation to the possession of about 60 credit cards, driver's licenses, gift cards and Social Security cards in the names of other persons. (Statutory references that follow are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.) The trial court placed defendant on probation with various terms and conditions, including that defendant submit his electronic storage devices and e-mail/Internet accounts to search without a search warrant.

Defendant now contends (1) the electronic device search condition is invalid under *126 People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 , 486, 124 Cal.Rptr. 905 , 541 P.2d 545 ( Lent ) 1 ; (2) the electronic device search condition violates his right to privacy and is overbroad; (3) the electronic device search condition violates his privilege against self-incrimination; (4) the electronic device search condition violates the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (§ 1546 et seq.); (5) the e-mail/Internet account search condition violates his right to privacy and his privilege…

Dissenting Opinion

Mauro, J.

I fully concur with parts I, III, IV, VI, VII, and VIII of the majority opinion, but I disagree with parts II and V addressing the electronic device search condition and the e-mail/internet search condition (hereafter the e-search conditions), which the majority opinion appears to analyze in the same manner. Although the majority opinion disagrees with the test applied in some other published opinions, I *157 would reach the same result regardless of the test. Whether the appropriate test is the "closely tailored" test or the "reasonableness" test (see the majority opinion at part IIA), I would remand the matter to the trial court to craft more closely tailored, or more reasonable, e-search conditions.

Given the current state of technology, I disagree with the majority that the intrusion imposed by the e-search conditions "is little different from the condition authorizing warrantless searches of defendant's residence." (Maj. opn. ante , at p. 433) Unless the e-search conditions are limited in some way, they authorize a potentially far greater intrusion than the search of a residence. Several years ago, in Riley v. California (2014) 573 U.S. 373 , 134 S.Ct. 2473 , [ 189 L.Ed.2d…

Sign in to read the full opinion

Create a free account to read the complete opinion text, citation history, and good-law status for this case.