George Pilola v. Craig Koenig

facts demonstrating entitlement to the relief requested,” and cited People v. Duvall,

9 Cal.4th 464, 474–75 (1995). This explanation leaves open the possibility that the

court denied the petition on procedural grounds (i.e., Pilola’s allegations were too

vague or conclusory) or on the merits (i.e., Pilola’s allegations were satisfactory, but

they failed to make out the elements of a claim pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373

U.S. 83 (1963), or Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959)). We must construe

ambiguous state court decisions as decisions on the merits “if such a construction is

plausible.” Chambers v. McDaniel, 549 F.3d 1191, 1197 (9th Cir. 2008); see also

Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d 943, 959–60 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, the construction is

plausible. Therefore, we must construe the California Supreme Court’s decision to

be on the merits and must apply AEDPA deference.

Because AEDPA deference applies, we cannot grant Pilola’s petition unless

the California Supreme Court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). This…