Max Anderson v. City of Bainbridge Island

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MAR 21 2012

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

MAX J. ANDERSON, No. 10-36140

Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:09-cv-05797-RBL

v.

MEMORANDUM*

CITY OF BAINBRIDGE ISLAND, a municipal corporation; RICHARD CHRISTOPHERSON, in his capacity as a police officer for the City of Bainbridge Island and as an individual; GUY ROCHE, in his capacity as a police officer for the City of Bainbridge Island, and as an individual,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 10, 2012 Seattle, Washington

Before: SCHROEDER, ALARCÓN, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. Appellant, Max Anderson, appeals the district court’s order granting

summary judgment to Appellees—City of Bainbridge Island, Richard

Christopherson, and Guy Roche—in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action…

MEMORANDUM *

Appellant, Max Anderson, appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Appellees — City of Bainbridge Island, Richard Christopherson, and Guy Roche — in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that Officers Christopher- *539 son and Roche violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force during his arrest. The district court held that the officers’ actions were reasonable as a matter of law, and that, in the alternative, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court also granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees on Anderson’s state law tort claim of assault. We affirm.

Sometime after midnight on October 28, 2007, Officers Christopherson and Roche were parked on Bainbridge Island when they observed a vehicle, traveling at a high speed, pass a van in a no-passing zone. The police officers turned on their emergency lights to follow. The vehicle then led them on a high-speed chase at 85 m.p.h., in a 55 m.p.h. zone, until the vehicle’s driver turned the headlights off and pulled into an industrial parking lot. The driver of the vehicle, Anderson, later declared that he had then parked behind a trailer to hide from…

Dissenting:

I conclude that there is a genuine dispute of material fact whether the officers’ use of force was excessive. We give Appellant the benefit of all justifiable inferences: Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 , 106 S.Ct. 2505 , 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103 , 1115 n. 5 (9th Cir.2004). Whether Appellees recognized Appellant is important in my view to whether there was a need for threatened deadly force. Telele v. United States, 511 F.3d 839, 844-45 (9th Cir.2007).

Appellant has provided sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer that the officers knew his identity when they pointed their guns at him. Both officers worked with Appellant’s father. Appellant had attended Officer Roche’s wedding. Officer Roche had been a social guest at Appellant’s parents’ house. Officer Christopherson had pulled Appellant over for speeding not long before this incident. At the time when deadly force was threatened by pointing guns at Appellant, he was lit up with a bright spotlight and not too far away from the officers, perhaps a distance of fifteen to thirty feet. A jury may permissibly infer from these facts that the officers…