Jerry Cavins v. Melvin Hunter
Opinion
Opinion
MEMORANDUM
Petitioner Jerzy Ray Cavins appeals from the dismissal of his habeas petition as untimely. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253 , and we affirm.
Cavins’s civil commitment became final on September 16, 1997. Cal. Civ.Proc.Code § 904.1(a)(2); former Cal. R. Ct. 30.1(a) (now 8.308). The one-year statute of limitations for Claims 2 and 5 began running the next day and expired on September 16, 1998. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(1)(A); Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir.2001). At the latest, the one-year statute of limitations for Claim 6 began running in October 2003, the date of Cavins’s final challenged periodic review. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(1)(D). Cavins brought Claims 2, 5 and 6 after the expiration of the limitations periods. These claims are, therefore, untimely.
While statutory tolling does apply during the pendency of a properly filed state habeas petition, the California Supreme Court denied Cavins’s state petitions raising Claims 2 and 5 as untimely. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(2); Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 , 125 S.Ct. 1807 , 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005). Statutory tolling does not apply to either claim.