Opeiu

MEMORANDUM ***

Pamela D. Hardine (“Hardine”) appeals the district court’s grant of summary judg *105 ment in her employment discrimination action under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) against the Office and Professional Employees International Union (“OPEIU”). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo whether state law claims are preempted under § 301. Cramer v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683, 689 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1078 , 122 S.Ct. 806 , 151 L.Ed.2d 692 (2002). We affirm.

The district court properly concluded that section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 , preempts Hardine’s state law claim because it is “inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract.” Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213 , 105 S.Ct. 1904 , 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985). In her complaint, Hardine’s sole claim is that OPEIU “failed and refused to fairly, properly, fully, adequately or accurately provide her with quality representation in her claims against her employer.” In other words, Hardine seeks to enforce duties that OPEIU owes as union…

concurring:

I write separately because I would hold that the union’s statutory duty of fair representation governs the issues of removal and preemption in this case, not § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”). The “statutory duty of fair representation ... includes a statutory obligation to serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct.” Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 , 87 S.Ct. 903 , 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967). Hardine’s sole claim is that the union “failed and refused to fairly, *106 properly, fully, adequately or accurately provide her with quality representation in her claims against her employer” and “denied her representation and discriminated against her because of her race ... and her disability.” On its face, this is clearly a claim for the union’s breach of its statutory duty of fair representation. Thus, the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction, and the ease was properly removed to the federal district court. See Stallcop v.Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 820 F.2d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir.1987). Hardine’s state law claims are…

FILED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 29 2012

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S . CO U RT OF AP PE A LS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PAMELA D. HARDINE, an individual, No. 10-56667

Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:09-cv-05885-GAF-CW

v.

MEMORANDUM *

OFFICE AND PROFESSIONAL

EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL

UNION, Erroneously Sued As Local 174 of the Office and Professional Employees International Union,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Gary A. Feess, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 14, 2012** Pasadena, California

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Before: PREGERSON and BEA, Circuit Judges, and PRATT, District Judge.***

Pamela D. Hardine ('Hardine') appeals the district court's grant of summary

judgment in her employment discrimination action under the California Fair

Employment and Housing…