facts.” Ramadan v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646, 650 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Husyev

v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 1172, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2008). The IJ properly concluded

that Petitioner did not the satisfy the “changed circumstances” or “extraordinary

circumstances” exception to the one-year deadline. Petitioner entered the United

States in January of 2005 and had until January of 2006 to apply for asylum. That

Petitioner lacked knowledge of the law, did not speak English, and had not begun

to fear criminal violence in Mexico until he was placed in removal proceedings,

did not constitute changed circumstances. See Ramadan, 479 F.3d at 657 (“The

term ‘changed circumstances’ . . . refer[s] to circumstances materially affecting the

applicant’s eligibility for asylum. . . .”) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.4 (a)(4)(i)); see

3 also Gasparyan v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1130, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2013) (delineating

“extraordinary circumstances” test).1

2. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that Petitioner failed

to establish a nexus between any harm and a protected ground to support his

application for withholding of removal. Petitioner testified that he became fearful

of returning to Mexico when crime increased in the country. Petitioner stated that

his father was shot, one of his cousins “disappeared,” and a friend was tortured.

These incidents caused Petitioner to experience fear and interrupted sleep.

However, Petitioner was never harmed. Nor did he demonstrate a well-founded

fear of future harm, or that the government was unable or unwilling to protect him.

See Robleto-Pastora v. Holder, 591 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2010), as amended.

Further, we have held that the “desire to be free from harassment by criminals

motivated by theft or random violence . . . bears no nexus to a protected ground.”

Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010), as amended (citations

omitted). For these reasons, substantial evidence supports the denial of

withholding of removal. See id.

1 To the extent Petitioner argues that his mental health concerns constituted extraordinary circumstances, we lack jurisdiction to review this disputed fact. See Ramadan, 479 F.3d at 648 (holding that our jurisdiction only extends to application of the law to undisputed facts). 4 3. Because Petitioner failed to address his CAT claim in his Opening Brief,

he has waived any objections to the denial of this claim. See Martinez-Serrano v.

I.N.S., 94 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1996).

PETITION DENIED.

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