DISCUSSION

We “cannot disregard” the Legislature’s subsequent expressions of its intent regarding a prior statute. (Western Security Bank v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 232, 244.) If an amendment “ ‘ “which in effect construes and clarifies a prior statute” ’ ” was

2 adopted soon after controversies arose about the proper interpretation of the statute, “ ‘ “it is logical to regard the amendment as a legislative interpretation of the original act -- a formal change -- rebutting the presumption of substantial change.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 243.) When a case involving such a clarifying amendment is on appeal, the appropriate resolution is to reverse and remand the matter for further proceedings in compliance with the amended legislation. (Id. at pp. 252-253.) Under former section 1170(d)(1), a trial court may, at any time upon the recommendation of the Secretary of the Department, “recall the sentence and commitment previously ordered and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if they had not previously been sentenced, provided the new sentence, if any, is no greater than the initial sentence.” This same language is contained in section 1170.03, which is where Assembly Bill No. 1540 moved the recall and resentencing provisions of former section 1170(d)(1). (§ 1170.03, subd. (a)(1).) Former section 1170(d)(1) (and now section 1170.03) authorizes the Secretary of the Department to recommend to the superior court that the court recall a previously imposed sentence and resentence the defendant. (See People v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155, 1165, citing Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442, 460.) The Department’s recommendation furnishes the court with jurisdiction it would not otherwise have to recall and resentence and is “an invitation to the court to exercise its equitable jurisdiction.” (People v. Frazier (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 858, 866.) In addition to moving the recall and resentencing provisions of former section 1170(d)(1) to section 1170.03, Assembly Bill No. 1540 also clarifies the required procedures including that, when recalling and resentencing, the court “shall . . . apply any changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion.” (§ 1170.03, subd. (a)(2).) Where, as here, the Department recommends recall and resentencing, the court is also now required to hold a hearing (unless the parties otherwise stipulate), state on the record its reasons for its decision, provide notice to the defendant, and appoint counsel

3 for the defendant. (§ 1170.03, subds. (a)(6)-(8), (b)(1).) Also, where a resentencing request is made, there is now a presumption in favor of recall and resentencing of the defendant, “which may only be overcome if a court finds the defendant is an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” (§ 1170.03, subd. (b)(2).) As we recently explained in People v. McMurray (2022) __ Cal.App.5th __ [2022 Cal. App. LEXIS 265], our review of the legislative history reveals that the Legislature “repeatedly indicated that Assembly Bill No. 1540 was intended to ‘make clarifying changes’ to former section 1170(d)(1), including specifying the required procedure and guidelines when the [Department] recommends recall and resentencing.” Given that the changes promptly addressed appellate decisions from 2020 that interpreted former section 1170(d)(1), the “appropriate remedy is to reverse and remand the matter, so that the trial court can consider the [Department]’s recommendation to recall and resentence defendant under the new and clarified procedure and guidelines of section 1170.03.” Just as in McMurray, we need not address whether we must also reverse and remand pursuant to In re Estrada.

DISPOSITION

The order declining to recall and resentence defendant is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

/s/ Robie, Acting P. J. We concur:

/s/ Mauro, J.

/s/ , Duarte, J.

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