introduction to Christianity, mostly because Li initially did not give dates when

3 asked when he became a Christian and instead stated that he was introduced to

Christianity by a friend when Li’s wife was in the hospital. Li elsewhere testified

that his wife was in the hospital in August of 1997, and that he met the introducing

friend in 1996. However, after the IJ pressed Li to provide a date for his

introduction to Christianity, Li stated that he was introduced in 1996. The IJ found

this testimony inconsistent with Li’s claim in his asylum application that he was

introduced to Christianity in August of 1997 when his wife was in the hospital.

This discrepancy, if it can be called one, is minor. Li was firm in his

testimony that he and his wife began to pray, upon a friend’s suggestion while his

wife was told in the hospital that she would not recover after a difficult pregnancy,

and that he attributed her recovery to his prayers. The confusion as to dates when

he met his friend, when his wife was in the hospital, and when he became a

Christian is immaterial, especially in the context of difficulty in interpretations

between English and Mandarin. See Damaize-Job v. INS, 787 F.2d 1332, 1337

(9th Cir. 1986) (“Minor discrepancies in dates that . . . cannot be viewed as

attempts by the applicant to enhance his claims of persecution have no bearing on

credibility.”); see also Martinez-Sanchez v. INS, 794 F.2d 1396, 1400 (9th Cir.

1986) (reversing adverse credibility determination based on “trivial errors” about

date the petitioner joined a paramilitary group).

4 Although the IJ found that Li’s unwillingness to respond called into question

whether the events happened, the record compels a contrary conclusion. In

reaching her determination, the IJ disregarded other significant and material

testimony about Li’s conversion to Christianity. Li testified that his prayers caused

him to believe that God would arrange everything, and that after he and his wife

prayed, “[his] wife woke up[, and they felt] like there was an angel with [them],

mentally and physically.” Li testified about his baptism ceremony in February

1998.

On that day it was a Sunday, everybody was happy for that special day, especially for myself and my wife. We were there to be baptized. First of all the pastor asked us if we confessed that we were sinners and we were willing to accept Jesus Christ as our Savior. And then we were baptized by dipping the water and our brothers and sisters applauded for our new life.

Li also testified that he “trusted [himself] into God,” and he felt “like [he]

was reborn.” The IJ did not address any of this detailed and specific testimony. If

the IJ had considered it, Li’s inability to specify a date about his conversion to

Christianity would hardly call into question “whether these events actually

occurred.”

2. Next, the IJ found that Li gave “nonresponsive” testimony about the

manner in which the police approached the house church prior to his arrest.

However, this finding also is not supported by substantial evidence. Li plainly

5 testified that “[s]omebody reported it[,]” and that “[s]even officers from the public

security bureau, along with the local community member or members . . . kicked

the door open and told [them] without authority’s permission [they] had gathering

at house church.” Li’s answers made clear that he was inside the house church at

the time of the arrest, so it is unreasonable to expect him to know how the police

approached the building. Li’s account was terse but plausible, and the IJ erred in

concluding that he “did not provide any responsive or non-evasive answer.”

3. The IJ further found that Li was inconsistent in recounting his church

attendance following his release from detention. Yet, but for one negative answer

that he quickly corrected, Li was consistent that he privately attended a house

church following his release. When pressed, he clarified that he attended once a

week, so perhaps two or three times in total. “[A] general response to questioning,

followed by a more specific, consistent response to further questioning is not a

cogent reason for supporting a negative credibility finding.” Kaur v. Ashcroft, 379

F.3d 876, 887 (9th Cir. 2004).

The IJ found this timeline “not plausible,” because other evidence suggested

that Li left China approximately a week after his release. Li attempted to explain

the inconsistency by claiming that he “went there at night” and that his “schedule

was very tight.” To the extent Li’s testimony in this respect was inconsistent or

implausible, such an inconsistency is trivial. See Xun Li v. Holder, 559 F.3d 1096,

6 1104 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding an inconsistency as to the number of times an

applicant hosted church meetings was an improper basis for the IJ’s adverse

credibility finding because it “does not impact the question of whether he was

attacked by Chinese authorities . . . or whether he would fear returning to China”).

4. The IJ also faulted Li for refusing to answer questions about the medical

treatment he received after his detention, stating that Li only “referred to locations

where treatment might have occurred, [and] not the type of treatment that he

received.” The IJ found that Li’s unwillingness to answer these questions called

into question whether the abuse he suffered rose to the level of persecution. Again,

the record is contrary. Li’s testimony about his hospital experience, including the

tests that were performed, and that he was held for three days based on a possible

minor concussion, was consistent with the hospital records that he submitted.

Further, Li’s detailed description of his detention, the physical abuse he suffered,

and the resulting injuries contradicts the IJ’s conclusion.

5. The IJ devoted considerable space to discussing Li’s “inconsistent and

unpersuasive testimony regarding his residence in the United States as it relates to

whether he attends church in Southern California.” The IJ made much of evidence

submitted by the Department of Homeland Security suggesting that Li may have

lived in New York, which would render his attendance of a California church

implausible. Yet Li denied ever living in New York, and the evidence suggesting

7 that he did contained a name that did not have the same spelling as Li’s name.

“Speculation and conjecture cannot form the basis of an adverse credibility

finding, which must instead be based on substantial evidence.” Shah v. INS, 220

F.3d 1062, 1071 (9th Cir. 2000). That Li inaccurately listed as a home address a

business several hundred miles away does not go to the heart of his claim.

In sum, we find that none of the grounds identified by the BIA are both

supported by substantial evidence and go to the heart of Li’s claim.

We further find the IJ erred in requiring Li to produce adequate

corroborating evidence for everything he said. “In a pre-REAL ID Act case,

absent other substantial evidence of adverse credibility, the production of

corroborating evidence cannot be required.” See Lei Li v. Holder, 629 F.3d 1154,

1160 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Lopez-Alvarado v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 847, 855 (9th

Cir. 2004)). “When credibility is the only issue on appeal, and once each of the

IJ’s reasons for finding adverse credibility is shown to be defective, this court

accepts a petitioner’s testimony as credible.” Id. (citing Soto-Olarte v. Holder, 555

F.3d 1089, 1095 (9th Cir. 2009)).

III. Conclusion

We reverse the adverse credibility determination, and remand to the agency

for further proceedings consistent with this disposition.

PETITION GRANTED and REMANDED.

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