facts in that claimant’s case. Vega looked to the text of ORS 742.504: “Every

policy required to provide the coverage specified in ORS 742.502 shall provide

uninsured motorist coverage that in each instance is no less favorable in any

respect to the insured or the beneficiary than if the following provisions were set

forth in the policy.” ORS § 742.504 (emphasis added); see Vega, 918 P.2d at

99–100. ORS 742.504(2)(c)’s definition of “[i]nsured,” in pertinent part, is “[t]he

3 named insured as stated in the policy.” ORS 742.502 created only a duty to

provide coverage to Estes that was no less favorable to him than the statutory

minimum.

Additionally, plaintiff argues that the GMC truck was not provided for

Estes’ regular use as a matter of fact, and thus the UIM exclusion does not apply.1

The GMC truck Estes was driving was furnished by his employer. It was regularly

parked in his driveway when not in use, Estes was permitted to use the truck for

business matters, and he was also permitted to use it for personal matters that did

not disrupt his work. That Estes had the ability to use the truck for both business

purposes and personal matters is dispositive under Oregon law. See George B.

Wallace Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 349 P.2d 789, 792 (Or. 1960)

(“[T]he phrase ‘furnished for regular use’ . . . implies a right to the regular use of

the automobile in the sense that there is an expressed or implied understanding

with the owner of an automobile that the insured could have the use of the

particular automobile or perhaps any automobile of the other at such times as he

1 Oregon’s general methodology for interpreting the terms of an insurance policy does not apply in cases involving statutorily required provisions. See Wright v. Turner, 322 P.3d 476, 478–79 (Or. 2014). In such cases, “the intent of the legislature, rather than the intent of the parties, controls.” Vega, 918 P.2d at 102. The method for interpreting statutes “begins with an analysis of the statute’s text and context.” Id. at 100. 4 desired, if available.”); N. Pac. Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 821 P.2d 444, 445 (Or. Ct.

App. 1991) (rejecting the argument that “furnished for regular use” requires “a

permanent right of control and the discretion to use the vehicle at such times as the

insured desires in place of or in addition to the insured’s own ‘owned’ vehicle,”

and holding that “[t]he language simply requires that it be available for the

insured’s ‘regular use’”).

AFFIRMED.

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