background evidence in the record and cited the IJ’s finding that the country

background documentation was insufficient to support Singh’s claim that Mann

Party members have been violently attacked or otherwise persecuted in India due

to their political views. See Singh v. Lynch, 802 F.3d 972, 975–76 (9th Cir. 2015),

overruled on other grounds by Alam, 11 F.4th at 1136; see also 8 U.S.C. §

1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (credibility determination may be based on “the consistency of .

. . statements with other evidence of record (including the reports of the

Department of State on country conditions)”).

Finally, regarding (4), the BIA reasonably “gave minimal weight to letters

from Mann [P]arty members who did not have first-hand knowledge of the alleged

incidents,” as well as an affidavit submitted by Singh’s uncle who, “while a

witness to one alleged attack, was not subject to cross-examination.” The BIA

also cited the IJ’s finding that an affidavit from a medical practitioner “was

insufficient to corroborate the cause of... [Singh’s] injuries.” Neither the IJ nor

the BIA ignored the submissions outright, but instead assessed them as less

credible. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s decision upholding the IJ’s

adverse credibility determination.

Substantial evidence thus supports the BIA’s decision upholding the IJ’s

denial of Singh’s claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT, which

were all based on the adverse credibility finding. See Li v. Garland, 13 F.4th 954, 4 958 (9th Cir. 2021). To be eligible for asylum, a petitioner has the burden to

demonstrate a likelihood of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on

account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or

political opinion. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). To be eligible for withholding of

removal, the petitioner must discharge this burden by a clear probability. 8 C.F.R.

§ 208.16(b)(2). The dispositive question in assessing a CAT claim is “whether the

alien is more likely than not to be tortured in the country of

removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(4).

However, to obtain any of the three types of relief sought by Singh, a

threshold eligibility requirement is the finding that the petitioner’s testimony meets

the statutory credibility standard. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii),

1231(b)(3)(C), 1229a(c)(4)(C); see also Singh, 802 F.3d at 977 (explaining that

“the agency may rely upon the same credibility determination in denying both the

asylum and CAT claims” when “a petitioner’s claims under the CAT are based on

the same statements that the BIA determined not to be credible.” (quotations and

alterations omitted)). Because the BIA did not err in affirming the IJ’s adverse

credibility finding, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s decision that Singh is

5 ineligible for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under CAT. 1 Moreover,

as to the CAT claim, the BIA also reasonably concluded that Singh failed to offer

independent evidence sufficient to sustain his burden.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

1 Respondent argues that Singh failed to adequately contest the BIA’s decision in his opening brief. Because Singh’s arguments fail on the merits, the Court does not reach the issue of whether his opening brief is so deficient as to constitute waiver of his claims on appeal.

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