facts supporting a reasonable fear of persecution on the relevant ground”) (citation

omitted). Aguilar Avila’s sparse and conclusory statements that he fears dangerous

conditions and gang violence in Mexico and El Salvador does not meet the

requisite level of specificity to satisfy his burden. See id.; see also

Duran-Rodriguez, 918 F.3d at 1028 (“Persecution is an extreme concept that does

3 not include every sort of treatment our society regards as offensive.”) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted).

2. Because Aguilar Avila failed to meet the lower burden of proof for

asylum, he necessarily failed to satisfy the clear probability standard required to

establish eligibility for withholding of removal. See Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th

1052, 1066 (9th Cir. 2021).

3. Substantial evidence also supports the denial of CAT relief. Aguilar

Avila’s general assertion that he will be tortured if returned to Mexico or El

Salvador is not supported by the record and is not based on a particularized harm to

him. See Eneh v. Holder, 601 F.3d 943, 948 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that “a

petitioner must show for purposes of CAT relief that someone—either a

government official or private actor—specifically intended to torture him or her”)

(citation omitted); see also Riera-Riera v. Lynch, 841 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir.

2016) (stating that generalized evidence is “insufficient for protection under CAT”)

(citation omitted).

4. Aguilar Avila’s Opening Brief did not address the agency’s discussion of

his failure to establish the requisite “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”

needed for cancellation of removal or special rule cancellation of removal. 8

U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D), (b)(2)(A)(v). Aguilar Avila has thus waived any

4 argument regarding these claims. See Martinez-Serrano v. I.N.S., 94 F.3d 1256,

1259-60 (9th Cir. 1996). In any event, Aguilar Avila failed to raise a colorable

legal or constitutional claim permitting review of this discretionary determination.

See Vilchiz-Soto, 688 F.3d at 644; see also Monroy, 821 F.3d at 1177-78.

5. Although Aguilar Avila’s Opening Brief challenged the BIA’s conclusion

that he was ineligible for cancellation on the basis of his prior conviction, his

Opening Brief did not address the agency’s discussion of his motion for

reconsideration. Accordingly, he has waived any argument regarding this claim.

See Martinez-Serrano, 94 F.3d at 1259-60. In any event, as the government notes,

Aguilar Avila failed to identify any error in the agency’s decision. See Membreno

v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 1227, 1230 n.5 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc); see also 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.2(b)(1).

PETITION DENIED in part and DISMISSED in part.

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