Bamonte

J. Mark Ogden, Laurent R.G. Badoux (argued), and Michael J. Lehet, Littler Mendelson, Phoenix, AZ, for appellee City of Mesa.

Arthur A. Hartinger, Meyers, Nave, Riback, Silver & Wilson, Oakland, CA, for Amici Curiae League of California Cities, California State Association of Counties, and the International Municipal Lawyers Association.

Before: RONALD M. GOULD and JOHNNIE B. RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and LLOYD D. GEORGE, [*] District Judge.

Opinion by Judge RAWLINSON; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge GOULD.

RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge:

Appellants, police officers employed by Appellee City of Mesa (City), challenge the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the City. The officers contended that the City violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by failing to compensate police officers for the donning and doffing of their uniforms and accompanying gear. Because officers had the option of donning and doffing their uniforms and gear at home, the district court determined that these activities were not compensable pursuant to the FLSA and the Portal-to-Portal Act. We agree that these activities were not compensable pursuant to the FLSA, and affirm…

Opinion by Judge RAWLINSON; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge GOULD.

Appellants, police officers employed by Appellee City of Mesa (City), challenge the district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the City. The officers contended that the City violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by failing to compensate police officers for the donning and doffing of their uniforms and, accompanying gear. Because officers had the option of donning and doffing their uniforms and gear at home, the district court determined that these activities were not compensable pursuant to the FLSA and the Portal-to-Portal Act. We agree that these activities were not compensable pursuant to the FLSA, and affirm the district court’s judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

The City of Mesa, like most other municipalities, requires its police officers to *1220 wear certain uniforms and related gear, usually including trousers, a shirt, a name-tag, a clip-on or velcro tie, specified footwear, a badge, a duty belt, a service weapon, a holster, handcuffs, chemical spray, a baton, and a portable radio. The wearing of body armor is optional, although the officers are required to have the body armor…

concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part:

I would not announce a bright-line location rule that controls the compensability of preliminary and postliminary activities under the FLSA. The location where an activity is performed is just one of many useful tools in the fact-sensitive compensability analysis. Location is not in and of itself the controlling test. Because I disagree with the majority’s approach and its holding with respect to job-related protective gear, I concur in the judgment only with respect to the majority’s determination that the donning and doffing of police uniforms is non-compensable. I would hold that the donning and doffing of protective gear is compensable, subject to a de minimis analysis on remand. Thus I respectfully dissent in part.

I

The majority creates a bright-line rule that donning and doffing uniforms and protective gear is integral and indispensable to police work, and thus compensable under the FLSA, only if a “requirement of law, rule, the employer, or the nature of the work mandates donning and doffing at the employer’s premises.” Op. at 1233. This new rule is contrary to the Supreme Court’s context-specific approach to…