Michele Dee Shorthouse appeals the sentence imposed after she had pleaded guilty to procuring the use of fire to commit the felony of interstate travel to commit arson and to travelling in interstate commerce with the intent to commit murder. The district court sentenced her to ten years for the latter offense and five years for the former offense, to be served consecutively, and on release from imprisonment to supervised release for six years. We affirm the judgment of the district court.

FACTS

Shorthouse, who at the time of the crime resided in Portland, Oregon, hired one Tony Johnson to burn down the house in Vancouver, Washington in which her current boyfriend’s ex-wife was living. When the burning of the house failed to scare the victim out of the neighborhood Shorthouse agreed to pay Johnson $10,000 to kill the same woman. She was apprehended before any killing took place.

PROCEEDINGS

Shorthouse pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 844 (h) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 in that she aided, abetted, induced and procured the use of fire in order to commit a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952 , interstate travel to commit arson. She also pleaded guilty to travelling in interstate commerce with the intent to commit murder in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958 , 18 U.S.C. § 3237 .

The government proposed imprisonment and also “three years supervised release on both counts, to run consecutively, bringing the total to six years.” The district court imposed the sentence of ten years imprisonment for her travel with intent to commit murder and five years for abetting arson to commit interstate arson. As to supervised release the court said, “I agree with the government’s analysis, to six years.” The court added:

ANALYSIS

Shorthouse’s entire appeal is based on 18 U.S.C. § 3624 , which is entitled “Release of a Prisoner.” Section (a) of this statute deals with the date of release. Section (b) deals with credit for satisfactory behavior. Section (c) deals with pre-release custody. Section (d) deals with what the Bureau of Prisons should furnish the prisoner on release. Section (e) is called “Supervision After Release” and reads as follows:

Out of the entire statute, Shorthouse has focused on a single sentence: “The term of supervised release commences on the day the person is released from imprisonment and runs concurrently with any Federal, State or local term of probation or supervised release or parole for another offense for which the person is subject or becomes subject during the term of supervised release.” In interpreting this statute the Eighth Circuit came to the conclusion that it “unambiguously states that terms of supervised release on multiple convictions are to run concurrently. We are of course bound to follow the plain language of the statute.” United States v. Gullickson, 982 F.2d 1231, 1236 (8th Cir.1993). Shorthouse argues that Gidlickson governs.

A different view was taken by the Tenth Circuit which, without reference to 18 U.S.C. § 3624 (e), held as follows:

United States v. Maxwell, 966 F.2d 546 , 551 (10th Cir.1992), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 826 , 121 L.Ed.2d 697 (1992).

We are invited by Shorthouse to follow Gullickson and by the government to follow Maxwell and to distinguish Gullickson . In our view 18 U.S.C. § 3624 (e) is not a blanket limitation on the sentencing powers of the district court. It is not an empty directive because there will be occasions on which a federal prisoner will have been sentenced for a local or state crime, for which the prisoner has been placed on parole, or sentenced for a federal crime where it was not mandatory that there be a federal prison sentence not running concurrently with another federal prison sentence. Gullickson , in fact, was such a case and is, therefore, distinguishable from the instant case.

The power of a federal court to impose supervised release is provided by 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (a), which reads as follows:

For a Class C or Class D felony a supervised release cannot be more than three years. Id. § 3583(b). The two felonies of which Shorthouse was convicted were Class C. 18 U.S.C. § 3559 (a)(1)(C). In imposing the sentence and determining its length the court is directed by 18 U.S.C. § 3583 to “consider the factors set forth in § 3553(a)_” The cross-reference to § 3553(a)(1) directs the court, inter alia, to take into account “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.” It is evident from the portion of the transcript quot ed above that the district court carefully did take into account the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of Shorthouse. In other words, the district court complied with the relevant statutes and followed their command.

In the instant case, the sentence required by Congress under 18 U.S.C. § 844 (h) was analogous to the sentence required under 18 U.S.C. § 924 (e) for use of a firearm. Section 844(h) declares: “[N]or shall the term of imprisonment imposed under this subsection run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment including that imposed for the felony in which the explosive was used or carried.” The statute makes no reference to a period of supervised release. The Guidelines do not address supervised release explicitly but do say in the case of a statute which mandates a consecutive sentence, “That sentence then runs • consecutively to the sentences imposed on the other counts.” United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, 5G1.2, Commentary, § 4 (1992). The Guidelines, “CHAPTER FIVE: Determining the Sentence,” has several parts as follows: “Part A-Sentencing Table; Part B-Probation; Part C-Imprisonment; Part D-Supervised Release_” It would make no sense to hold that the Guidelines treat “Supervised Release” when “Determining the Sentence” but did not mean to include supervised release when they say that a sentence that runs consecutively must be “treated separately.”

The statutory scheme of sentencing, including the Guidelines, must be construed harmoniously as a whole. “Release of a Prisoner,” 18 U.S.C. § 3624 (e) should not be construed to countermand the Guidelines and countermand the congressional interest that certain sentences not run concurrently. Accordingly, we hold that 18 U.S.C. § 3624 (e) does not apply to a sentence of supervised release in the case of a sentence that by statute is mandated to be consecutive.

AFFIRMED.