United States v. Patrick Innie

7 F.3d 840 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Patrick INNIE, Defendant-Appellant. No. 92-50239. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted April 8, 1993. Decided Oct. 5, 1993. Francis J. James, Deputy Federal Public Defender, Los Angeles, CA, for defendant-appellant. Rob B. Villeza, Asst. U.S. Atty., Los Angeles, CA, for plaintiff-appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Before: WALLACE, Chief Judge, O'SCANNLAIN and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges. O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge: 1 We must decide whether a sentencing court may determine a convicted defendant's offense level based upon the total volume of a liquid mixture containing methamphetamine and whether being an accessory after the fact to murder for hire is a crime of violence under the 1989 Sentencing Guidelines. 2 * In 1988, Patrick Innie failed to appear for sentencing after pleading guilty to being an accessory after the fact to the commission of murder for hire in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3 . A warrant was issued for his arrest. 3 On February 16, 1989, Innie was arrested by the Culver City Police in the parking lot of the West End…

We must decide whether a sentencing court may determine a convicted defendant’s offense level based upon the total volume of a liquid mixture containing methamphetamine and whether being an accessory after the fact to murder for hire is a crime of violence under the 1989 Sentencing Guidelines.

I

In 1988, Patrick Innie failed to appear for sentencing after pleading guilty to being an accessory after the fact to the commission of murder for hire in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3 . A warrant was issued for his arrest.

On February 16, 1989, Innie was arrested by the Culver City Police in the parking lot of the West End Gardens Motel in Culver City, California. After his arrest, Innie consented to an interview with federal marshals. Upon being advised of his Miranda rights, Innie told the marshals that he was using his brother’s name, that he was staying in room 4 at the motel, that he was driving a 1977 Cadillac, and that he was supporting himself by “cooking meth.” He said that there was a black bag with two guns in it by the bed in his motel room. Innie told the marshals that the barrel of one of the guns had been converted from a 10 millimeter to a .45 caliber and that the other gun…

concurring:

I concur in the majority opinion except for section VB. I cannot join in this part of the majority opinion, and concur only in its result.

Our opinion is very narrow: it concerns only the Guidelines in effect at the time of Innie’s arrest. Under the categorical approach of those Guidelines, we may “not look to the specific conduct” of which the defendant was convicted, “but only to the statutory definition of the crime.” United States v. Becker, 919 F.2d 568, 570 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 911 , 111 S.Ct. 1118 , 113 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991). Innie pleaded guilty to being an accessory after the fact to murder for hire in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3 . This statute provides that “[wjhoever, knowing that an offense against the United States has been committed, receives, relieves, comforts or assists the offender in order to hinder or prevent his apprehension, trial or punishment, is an accessory after the fact.” I agree with the majority that, under this statutory definition, the accessory after the fact offense is not a crime of violence. Maj. op. at 851.

Our cases do carve out a limited exception to the general rule that a court may only look to the fact of…