This is an appeal from the dismissal of a class action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent Operation Rescue and others from interfering with women’s access to abortion clinics and preventing and hindering state law enforcement officials from securing to women the ability to exercise that constitutional right, 721 F.Supp. 1168 .

During the pendency of this appeal, the United States Supreme Court granted certio-rari in a case involving a similar situation, in *681 which abortion clinics and organizations having members who wish to use the clinics brought an action against Operation Rescue for blocking the access of women who sought the services of the clinic. That ease presented issues of whether provisions of the Ku Klux Klan Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (3), could be invoked as a basis for relief. Nearly identical issues are involved in this case. Therefore, submission of this case was withdrawn pending the decision of the United States Supreme Court. The Court has rendered its decision in Bray v. Alexandria Clinic, 506 U.S.—, 113 S.Ct. 753 , 122 L.Ed.2d 34 (1993), and we hereby resubmit this case.

The Supreme Court in Bray held that the first clause of section 1985(3), the “deprivation” clause, did not provide a federal cause of action against persons obstructing access to abortion clinics. The Court declined to decide whether the second clause of section 1985(3), the “hindrance” clause, provided a federal cause of action. It held that the issue was not properly before the Court and, thus, remanded the case for further proceedings. Bray , — U.S. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 765 , 122 L.Ed.2d at 56 .

The Bray decision forecloses the plaintiffs’ claims under the first clause of section 1985(3), but leaves open for our consideration the plaintiffs’ claims under the “hindrance” clause.

I. FACTS

The named plaintiffs-appellants are 12 health care providers, a not-for-profit corporation primarily consisting of member abortion providers, the membership organization of California National Organization of Women (“NOW”), a medical director of a health care provider, and two women denied access to non-abortion related family planning services and gynecological care furnished by such providers (collectively “Federation”). The defendants-appellants include Operation Rescue, a nationwide association that is opposed to abortion, and five alleged individual “blockade” organizers (collectively “Operation Rescue”).

The Federation appeals the district court’s dismissal of its two federal claims, based on 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (3), and six pendent state claims, 1 as well as denial of its motion for reconsideration or, alternatively, for leave to file a second amended complaint.

The order dismissing the first amended complaint was granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim for relief. Review for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is de novo. See, e.g., Western Reserve Oil & Gas Co. v. New, 765 F.2d 1428, 1430 (9th Cir.1985), ce rt. denied, 474 U.S. 1056 , 106 S.Ct. 795 , 88 L.Ed.2d 773 (1986). Review is limited to the contents of the complaint and all allegations of material fact are accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Id. A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is inappropriate “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 , 78 S.Ct. 99, 102 , 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). The Federation also appeals the denial of its alternative motion for leave to amend its complaint, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). Review is for an abuse of discretion. DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir.1987).

II. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT

The alleged federal cause of action was brought under the first two clauses of section 1985(3). These clauses provide a civil cause of action

The first clause is commonly designated the “deprivation” clause; the second as the “prevention” or “hindrance” clause. We shall refer to the latter as the “hindrance” clause.

A. Deprivation Clause

In order to state a cause of action under the deprivation clause, the conspiracy must be for the purpose of depriving the person or class of persons of the “equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.”

The Supreme Court in Bray stated:

— U.S. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 758 , 122 L.Ed.2d at 45 . The plaintiffs’ complaint under the deprivation clause was based upon the theory that either women in general or women seeking abortions constituted a protected class under the deprivation clause. The Bray opinion forecloses this assertion. The Court held that the phrase “otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus” could not apply to a class of women seeking abortions because they were not a protected class, and could not apply to women as a whole because the animus was not directed toward women but toward abortion. Bray , — U.S. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 759 , 122 L.Ed.2d at 46 .

Further, the Bray opinion held that the deprivation clause requires “an intent to deprive persons of a right guaranteed against pñvate impairment.” Id. — U.S. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 762 , 122 L.Ed.2d at 49 . The Court held the right to abortion was guaranteed against state impairment, but not private impairment. Id. — U.S. at — —, 113 S.Ct. at 763-64 , 122 L.Ed.2d at 51 -52 The Court also held that although the right of interstate travel is a right constitutionally protected against private impairment, that right was not the purpose of the alleged conspiracy. The Court stated that

Id. — U.S. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 762-763 , 122 L.Ed.2d at 50-51 .

The Court also held that plaintiffs failed to establish a conspiracy to violate the right to interstate travel for a second reason. The guarantee of the right of interstate travel protects against two burdens, neither of which was established. The two burdens are the erection of actual barriers to interstate travel and treating interstate travelers differently from intrastate travelers. There was no indication of either in Bray. Id. — U.S. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 763 , 122 L.Ed.2d at 51 .

The substantive holding of the Court in Bray was that a cause of action under the deprivation clause did not exist for two reasons — the lack of a protected class and the lack of an alleged interference with a right guaranteed against private impairment. Though the application of the hindrance clause was discussed, the claim under that clause was remanded for further proceedings.

Justice Scalia wrote the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Kennedy, and Thomas con *683 curred in its entirety. Justice Souter concurred in part and dissented in part. He concurred in the holding that no cause of action was stated under the deprivation clause and agreed that the case should be remanded for consideration of whether a cause of action existed under the hindrance clause. In his partial dissent, he disagreed, however, with the analysis of the hindrance clause that was expressed in the dictum of Justice Sealia’s opinion. Id. — U.S. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 769-76 , 122 L.Ed.2d at 59-67 .

B. Hindrance Clause

The Bray case left open for later consideration the interpretation of the hindrance clause, but provides conflicting views on the issue. As we look to the opinions in the Bray case for guidance as to the intention of the Court, we are left with a perplexing situation. Given Justice White’s resignation, four justices have indicated in dictum that the hindrance clause should be interpreted with the same restrictions as the deprivation clause and four justices interpret the hindrance clause more broadly.

It is thus our task to extend our best efforts to construe the “hindrance” clause giving due consideration to the language of the statute, the intent of Congress, and the reasoning in the varying opinions of the Justices of the Supreme Court.

The dictum of Justice Sealia’s opinion tentatively interprets the hindrance clause to require the same two restrictions on the hindrance clause as on the deprivation clause, because we would otherwise be construing the phrase “equal protection” differently in two clauses of the same statute. Bray , — U.S. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 765-66 , 122 L.Ed.2d at 54 . Justice Scalia also expresses the concern that to rule otherwise would open the hindrance clause to over-broad applicability, such as “an available weapon against the mass ‘sit-ins’ that were conducted for purposes of promoting desegregation in the 1960’s — a wildly improbable result.” Id.

The four dissenters responded that the plain language of the statute does not require such restrictions. They contend that the Court in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 , 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1798 , 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971), imported requirements into the deprivation clause that were not expressed in the statutory language in order to give effect to Congress’ intent to avoid extending the scope of that clause to encompass a vast array of traditional state law torts. They contend, however, that the same policy considerations are not involved in interpreting the hindrance clause. Justice Stevens notes that,

— U.S. at — — —, 113 S.Ct. at 783 , 122 L.Ed.2d at 75-76 .

This is the general view of each of the dissenting justices; however, each has a slightly different opinion of how the hindrance clause should be applied. These may be briefly cataloged as follows:

Justice Souter

The purpose of the conspiracy must be to hinder or prevent law enforcement authori *684 ties from giving normal police protection to persons attempting to exercise an independently protected constitutional right. The proscriptions of the statute would not reach demonstrations that only have the incidental effect of overwhelming police authorities. Id. — U.S. at—n. 10, 113 S.Ct. at 777 n. 10, 122 L.Ed.2d at 68 n. 10. There need not be animus toward a particular protected class. There also is no need to require that the constitutional right be one protected only against state action, because thwarting the state’s exercise of its police power is tantamount to the exercise of the state’s police power. Thus, the constitutional right to abortion, as recognized by the Supreme Court, would qualify as a protected right under the hindrance clause. Id. — U.S. at — — —, 113 S.Ct. at 776-77 , 122 L.Ed.2d at 67-68 .

III. CONSTRUCTION OF HINDRANCE CLAUSE

Focusing on the dictum of the majority opinion and the composite of the dissenting opinions, we now proceed to interpret the hindrance clause, having in mind the express language of the statute and the intent of *685 Congress in enacting this civil rights legislation.

It is important to keep in mind that section 1985(3) applies only to private persons impairing equal protection of the laws, whereas the Fourteenth Amendment applies to state impairment. The policy considerations are somewhat different. The full expanse of federal protection against state action is not necessarily what Congress intended for federal protection against private action. Likewise, there are different policy considerations involved in the application of the deprivation clause and the hindrance clause of section 1985(3).

We note first the distinction in the statutory language of the two clauses. The deprivation clause states the purpose of the conspiracy to be to deprive a class of persons of equal protection, whereas the hindrance clause states the purpose of the conspiracy to be to prevent or hinder the constituted state authorities from giving or securing to all persons within such state the equal protection of the laws. The fact that the hindrance clause applies only to conspiracies to hinder state officials raises no specter of federalizing general tort laws, which was the major concern expressed in Griffin and Carpenters .

On the other hand, a literal construction of the hindrance clause would make actionable the combined action of two or more persons for the purpose of hindering police from protecting the rights of any person under any state or federal law. Justice Scalia notes the literal language of the clause would be applicable to protecting the rights of restaurant owners from the civil rights sit-ins of 1960’s. None of the four dissenting justices would give such a broad literal construction of the clause. Giving effect to every requirement expressed in one or more of their opinions, as we have noted, the hindrance clause would provide a cause of action only where the purposeful hindering of the police was directed at a protected class exercising a constitutional right. It would be considered directed at the class if it is an activity engaged in exclusively by that class.

As so interpreted, the applicability of the hindrance clause is considerably narrowed. First, the purpose must be to interfere with state law enforcement, not just to interfere with the persons seeking to exercise their legal rights. Thus, where the effect of a demonstration, a parade, or picketing interferes with someone’s rights, this would not be actionable unless that was the purpose of the conspiracy. Second, if the interference with the police does not concern a protected class, it does not constitute a cause of action. Thus, the restaurant owners in the. sit-ins or businesses in labor disputes would not have a cause of action under this clause. Third, the right must be a constitutional right. Thus, ordinary trespasses or torts would not qualify-

Although the first restriction — the purpose restriction — is expressed in the language of the statute, the latter two — the class restriction and the constitutional right restriction— are not. Thus, this interpretation of the hindrance clause also imports some restrictions into the express language of the statute in order to effect congressional intent.

A legitimate question is raised in the dictum of Justice Scalia’s opinion — if we are placing class and constitutional right restrictions on the first clause of the statute in order to effectuate congressional intent, should we not utilize the same restrictive language for the second clause. He notes that both clauses refer to equal protection of the laws. A persuasive answer, however, is that the same overbreadth concerns are not present in each. The purpose of interfering with state law enforcement avoids the major reason for the restrictions applied in Griffin and Carpenters — the potential constitutional problem of federalizing state tort law.

There is a significant distinction between the clauses. The deprivation clause concerns conspiracies of some private persons to commit tortious actions against other private persons. The restrictions of Griffin and Carpenters leave most of such activity to be hándled by state enforcement. The hindrance clause, on the other hand,- concerns conspiracies to thwart state law enforcement from protecting against such tortious activity-

With the hindrance clause being directed at thwarting state law enforcement from pro- *686 teeting activities the deprivation clause leaves for state law enforcement, there is reasonable justification for covering at least all constitutional rights and activities exclusively engaged in by a protected class.

IV. ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT

The First Amended Complaint that was dismissed by the district court, in its Second Cause of Action, under the heading “Conspiracy to Frustrate and/or Hinder Law Enforcement,” made the following allegations:

The proposed Second Amended Complaint added the following allegation:

The district court’s denial of the proposed second amended complaint was not on the basis of bad faith, undue delay, or prejudice to the opposing party. See Ascon Properties, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir.1989). The reason for the denial of leave to amend was that the proposed amended complaint still failed to state a claim for relief. Thus, it is appropriate to consider the proposed amended complaint to determine if a cause of action is stated.

The complaint adequately alleges a cause of action for a conspiracy to hinder state law enforcement officers from securing to women the right to obtain an abortion. These allegations, if proven, are sufficient to create a question of fact to be determined at trial.

V. CONCLUSION

We conclude that a conspiracy to prevent or hinder state law enforcement officers from securing the constitutional right to an abortion for women, a class exclusively seeking to exercise that right, is actionable under the hindrance clause of section 1985(3). We do not determine the extent to which the hindrance clause applies; only that this application is within the express language of the statute and fulfills the intent of Congress in this civil rights statute. The allegations of this complaint state the type of nationwide conspiracy to prevent or hinder state law enforcement from securing and protecting women in the exercise of a constitutional right that is analogous to the type of conspiracy to hinder state law enforcement that brought about the- original enactment of the hindrance clause of section 1985(3).

REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

. The state claims alleged in the first amended complaint are:

The district court exercised its discretion to dismiss these state claims without prejudice. See United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27 , 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1139 , 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966).