Paul G. Shultz v. Department of Army, United States of America

Good Law
10 F.3d 649·93 Daily Journal DAR 15032·1993 WL 489815·1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 31037·93 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8781
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitNovember 30, 199392-35197, 92-35580California7,522 words

Opinion

Opinion

Fletcher, J.

Paul G. Shultz appeals the district court’s judgment in favor of the government in his action to quiet title under 28 U.S.C. § 2409a to a public light (or rights) of way across Fort Wainwright. He argues that the district court erred in finding that no rights of way existed within the meaning of 43 U.S.C. § 932 (“RS 2477 rights of way”), or that, if they did exist, his cause of action, nonetheless, was barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g) (the statute of limitations for quiet title actions). In the alternative, Shultz contends that even if no RS 2477 right of way existed prior to the Army’s acquisition of land, the Army took the land subject to other forms of easements that provided public passage. The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (Quiet Title) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Federal Question). Our jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (Final Judgments).

As a threshold matter, the Army appears to press a challenge to the district court’s jurisdiction by questioning Shultz’s standing to litigate all but the roads abutting his property. Tr. I at 28, 30. It disputes whether Shultz has a “special and vital interest” in roads that do not abut his property. See…

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