dissenting:

I dissent because Dr. Clark’s declaration did not provide evidence that a fire took place in the drum.

We may affirm the district court’s decision on any grounds supported in the record even if the district court reached its decision for different reasons. See United States v. Washington, 969 F.2d 752, 755 (9th Cir.1992) cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1945 , 123 L.Ed.2d 651 (1993); Lofton v. Heckler, 781 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir.1986). Assuming ar-guendo that the majority has correctly concluded that the expert testimony was improperly struck, Maffei has failed to allege that a fire took place in the drum within the meaning of the hostile fire exception. We should therefore affirm the granting of summary judgment.

The district court correctly held that the parties contemplated the term “fire” would be defined in its “ordinary and popular sense.” AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.3d 807 , 274 Cal.Rptr. 820, 831 , 799 P.2d 1253 (1990). Under California law, “if the meaning a layperson-would ascribe to contract language is not ambiguous,” that meaning should be applied. Id. The district court defined fire as “oxidation rapid enough to produce heat and light.” Although California courts have never ruled on the matter, courts in other states have defined fire similarly. See, e.g., Washington State Hop Producers, Inc. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 34 Wash.App. 257 , 660 P.2d 768, 769 (1983); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Electrical Dist., 9 Ariz.App. 374, 376-77 , 452 P.2d 539, 541-42 (1969).

Dr. Clark defined “fire” as “a process whéreby a substance ... undergoes a chemical reaction, generally with an oxidizer, usually oxygen. This reaction releases heat, light and gases.” Dr. Clark also maintained that “[i]n many cases, the products of a fire are not visible, i.e., only a very small amount of ‘light’ is emitted in the visible wavelength range.” Dr. Clark concluded that his “composite definition of ‘fire’ ” was “satisfied in all respects by the physical evidence.” However, he subsequently stated that the chemical reaction in the drum consisted of oxidation, heat, and “a ‘flame’ or cloud of gases.” (emphasis added).

The majority adopts Maffei’s argument that the definition of fire employed by his expert is consistent with the definition used by the district court. The majority ignores two important distinctions. First, Dr. Clark opined that a fire can consist of oxidation, heat and a “ ‘flame’ or cloud of gases.” Sec *901 ond, Dr. Clark maintains that the flame generated by the fire need not be visible. Dr. Clark’s definition of fire includes chemical reactions that are excluded by the specific language of the insurance policies. There is no evidence that would raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding the “hostile fire” exception.

The majority opinion will potentially allow Maffei to obtain insurance coverage that he did not bargain or pay for. If followed, it will surely affect insurance premiums since it overrides specific exclusions that the insurer and the insured bargained for. Maffei may benefit initially, but he and others similarly situated will surely pay in the future.

I respectfully dissent.