concurring:

I agree with the majority that this ease must be remanded for resentencing, but my grounds for decision are more limited than those of the majority opinion.

At sentencing, the district court said to Cantu that “while it is clear [ ] that you are suffering from post traumatic stress disorder ... I can find nowhere in the report an indication that you are suffering from a significantly reduced mental capacity.” This comment indicates, I believe, that the sentencing judge believed that post-traumatic stress disorder, of itself, cannot constitute or rise to the level of a significantly reduced mental capacity. I agree with the majority that this proposition is erroneous as a matter of law, for reasons well stated by Judge Reinhardt in Section C.l of his majority opinion; I therefore concur in that part of his opinion.

Because the district court appears to have made the decision not to depart downward under the mistaken view that post-traumatic stress disorder could not qualify as “significantly reduced mental capacity” under Guideline § 5K2.13, we must vacate and remand for resentencing. See United States v. Brown, 985 F.2d 478, 483 (9th Cir.1993) (sentencing court s error in ruling that it lacked discretion to depart downward requires remand for resentencing).

Beyond that, I would not go. The district court made no factual determination whether Cantu’s post-traumatic stress disorder contributed to the commission of his offense, and I would leave that determination to the district court. Even more clearly, the district court never reached the questions whether Cantu’s crime was non-violent, whether it was caused by voluntary use of drugs or other intoxicants, and whether Cantu’s criminal history indicates a need for his incarceration to protect the public. I would neither rule nor expound on these questions before the district court has addressed them.