United States v. Harry Armondo Dorri

15 F.3d 888 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Harry Armondo DORRI, Defendant-Appellant. No. 92-50339. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted June 10, 1993. Decided Feb. 3, 1994. Guy C. Iversen, Deputy Federal Public Defender, Los Angeles, California, for defendant-appellant Harry Armondo Dorri. Saul D. Brenner, Assistant United States Attorney, Los Angeles, California, for plaintiff-appellee United States of America. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Before: KOZINSKI, SILER, * and KLEINFELD, Circuit Judges. SILER, Circuit Judge: 1 Defendant Harry Armondo Dorri appeals his conviction for soliciting a bribe pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 201 (b)(2)(A). The only issue on appeal is whether the district court erred by failing to respond more explicitly to an inquiry by a deliberating jury concerning the definition of the word "corruptly." Finding no error, we affirm the ruling of the district court. THE FACTS 2 Dorri was an employee of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Seta Sarrafian is an alien who was applying to the INS for a permanent residency card, or "green card." Defendant…

Defendant Harry Armondo Dorri appeals his conviction for soliciting a bribe pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 201 (b)(2)(A). The only issue on appeal is whether the district court erred by failing to respond more explicitly to an inquiry by a deliberating jury concerning the definition of the word “corruptly.” Finding no error, we affirm the ruling of the district court.

THE FACTS

Dorri was an employee of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Seta Sar-rafian is an alien who was applying to the INS for a permanent residency card, or “green card.” Defendant told Sarrafian several times by telephone that if she paid him $1,000 he could guarantee the processing of her green card application. In addition, defendant attempted to use Sarrafian to solicit *890 bribes on his behalf from other resident aliens who were applying for green cards. However, unknown to him, some of the calls were recorded by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and he was eventually indicted and tried for violating 18 U.S.C. § 201 (b)(2)(A), by “corruptly ... seeking] ... anything of value ... in return for ... being influenced in the performance of any official act.”

Later, in an interview with the…

dissenting.

The heart of Dorri’s defense was that he wasn’t acting corruptly. He was, rather, conducting a one-man sting: He would lure Sarafian into paying a bribe in order to trap her employer. Far-fetched? No doubt. Goofy? To be sure. But — if believed by the jury — surely not illegal.

The trouble was, the jury said it had difficulty with the term “corruptly,” an element of 18 U.S.C. § 201 (b)(2)(A), and the key to Dorri’s defense. After learning that the jury was confused, Dorri’s counsel objected to the original instruction and asked the judge to clarify this term. The majority, nevertheless, says that defendant failed to comply with Fed.R.Crim.P. 30, which requires only that an objecting party “stat[e] distinctly the matter to which that party objects and the grounds of the objection.” According to the majority, defense counsel was required to do more than point out the problem — he was required to come up with a solution, i.e., propose specific language the district judge could use to further instruct the jury.

While it’s certainly good practice for a lawyer to suggest such language, I had always thought the responsibility for getting the law right lay with the district…