concurring:

Kahssai’s asylum claim is based upon the arrests and killings of her father and brother, the detention of her mother, and her own forcible assumption of a new identity. The BIA was unconvinced by her claim, finding that (1) political conditions had changed in Ethiopia, (2) her testimony lacked credibility, and (3) even if her family had suffered persecution, Kahssai herself had not. In light of these findings, it ruled that Kahssai had not established her statutory eligibility for asylum.

In our per curiam opinion, we remand this case to correct the BIA’s erroneous use of administrative notice. We express no opinion on the other issues involved in Kahssai’s asylum claim. Nevertheless, I believe that some indication of our views might be helpful to the BIA. Accordingly, I write separately to make clear my own disagreement with the BIA’s assessment of the issues of credibility and persecution in this case.

I.

The BIA adopted the IJ’s credibility determination, stating that the “[a]fter a careful review of the record, we find that there is no adequate basis for overturning the immigration judge’s adverse credibility finding.” It should be noted, however, that while purporting to defer to the IJ, the BIA inaccurately characterizes his finding. The IJ did not simply find that Kahssai’s testimony lacked credibility, as the BIA states. Instead, the IJ challenged Kahssai’s credibility only as to her alleged fear of persecution. He specifically noted that her credibility in describing the events of 1974 “cannot be determined” because of her young age at that time. Finally, the IJ made no explicit credibility determination as to Kahssai’s testimony regarding later events. His description of those events, however, is consistent with her testimony, so that it is reasonable to assume either that he found the testimony credible or that it in fact is so. See Damaize-Job v. INS, 787 F.2d 1332, 1338 (9th Cir.1986).

The substance of Kahssai’s asylum claim hinges on the events of 1974. As Kahssai stated, in that year, “everything happened in the family”: she lost her father, her brother, her mother, and as a result she was forced to take on a new identity and a new religion. By declining to make credibility findings with respect to Kahssai’s testimony and that of her siblings concerning the events of that *326 year, and thereby declining to rule on whether he believes the events did or did not occur, the IJ stripped Kahssai of a proper opportunity to establish her claim.

Generally, an IJ’s credibility determinations are reviewed for substantial evidence. Turcios v. INS, 821 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir.1987). 1 The explicit refusal to make a credibility determination should not be due the same deference; 2 but even were this deferential standard to be applied, the IJ’s ruling would fail. The IJ based his refusal to evaluate Kahssai’s credibility in describing the events of 1974 on the fact that Kahssai was extremely young at the time, and as a result her testimony regarding those events was the result of secondhand knowledge. These facts do not justify an abdication of the IJ’s responsibility to make a credibility determination, however. First, portions of Kahssai’s testimony were explicitly based on personal recollection. 3 Even at age three, one is likely to remember the traumatic loss of one’s family. Second, there is a difference between describing things that one learned as a ehild, and reciting a fabricated story. 4 The IJ did not say that he thought Kahssai was lying. But if she was telling the truth about being raised by her uncle and being told that her father and brother had been killed, and her mother arrested, then, even without a living eyewitness to the events who could testify before the IJ, there is no reason to doubt that the events occurred. 5

*327 Finally, the IJ made no explicit credibility determination regarding the testimony of Kahssai’s brothers and sister. Generally, when findings have not been made regarding a witness’ credibility in a deportation hearing, the reviewing court should presume that the IJ found the witness’ testimony credible. Artiga Turcios v. INS, 829 F.2d 720, 723 (9th Cir.1987). All three of the siblings testified to the events in question, confirming Kahss-ai’s description of them. Kahssai’s sister Dell was 18 in 1974, old enough so that her testimony regarding the father’s death could have been sufficient to establish it as a fact (she had left Ethiopia by the time of her mother’s detention and disappearance).

The IJ impliedly cast doubt upon the siblings’ credibility by stating that they “differed in their recollection of the death of their father, which ranged from heart attack to execution, and were totally inconsistent with respect to their mother’s alleged imprisonment.” Here the IJ’s recollection is faulty, rather more than the witnesses’. All of the siblings agreed that the father was executed, and although the sister stated that the authorities told them that he died of a heart attack, her testimony clearly indicated that she did not believe this explanation. As for their testimony regarding the fate of the mother, the only inconsistency was that Tsion Kahssai said that the mother was tortured while Dell Kahssai said she was not; they agreed that the mother was imprisoned, interrogated, and then released because of her pregnancy. This one inconsistency is minor in relation to the bulk of the evidence presented, and minor inconsistencies are insufficient to support a credibility challenge. See Damaize-Job, 787 F.2d at 1337 .

In addition to his failure to make credibility determinations regarding these past events, the IJ expressly doubted the credibility of Kahssai’s testimony regarding her fear of future persecution. Of course, the IJ’s unwillingness to believe the Kahssai’s family had suffered persecution in the past would partially account for his scepticism regarding Kahssai’s fear of future persecution. Moreover, his additional reasons for challenging Kahssai’s credibility regarding future persecution are either irrelevant or unsound. As we explained in Aguilera-Cota v. INS, 914 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir.1990), such grounds cannot support a negative credibility determination. Instead,

Id. at 1381 . The reasons stated by the IJ fail this standard. He cites the fact that Kahssai’s uncle allegedly prefers to claim asylum in the United States rather than India, as if it reflects badly on Kahssai’s own claim. The circumstances in Kahssai’s case and those of her uncle’s are entirely different. Moreover, the question of the desires of Kahssai’s uncle is wholly irrelevant to the focus on individual circumstances mandated for asylum proceedings. See, e.g., Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1574 (9th Cir.1986). The IJ also contends that Kahssai was permanently resettled in India, or could have applied for asylum there. First, the failure to apply for asylum in other countries is clearly not relevant to a credibility determination (see Damaize-Job, 787 F.2d at 1337 ). Nor is the issue of “firm resettlement” relevant to an evaluation of the alien’s statutory eligibility for asylum, but instead only to the subsequent step of weighing discretionary factors (see 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.14 & 208.15; Matter of Soleimani, Int.Dec. 3118 (BIA 1989)). Next, Kahssai lived in India between the ages of nine and seventeen: it would be unreasonable to hold an adolescent responsible for arranging or failing to arrange permanent resettlement.

Finally, the IJ states that it is unbelievable that members of Kahssai’s father’s family would be persecuted while her uncle — the husband of her mother’s sister — would entirely escape harassment. Here, the IJ’s view of Ethiopian family relationships is based on unfounded assumptions not applicable to a society in which the dominant family member is without question the husband, and the woman submissively marries into her spouse’s family. The IJ fails to consider that *328 where we see one family, the Ethiopian government sees two families: one headed by Kahssai’s father, who was the object of persecution, and one headed by her uncle, who was not considered to be an enemy of the state.

In short, I believe that the IJ clearly erred in finding that Kahssai lacked credibility in describing her fear of persecution. There is no substantial evidence in the record supporting his conclusion, since “the information relied upon by the IJ to question [Kahssai’s] credibility reveals nothing about whether or not [Kahssai] is an honest individual,” or whether or not she truly fears for her safety in Ethiopia. Damaize-Job, 787 F.2d at 1338 .

Both the IJ’s specific unwillingness to make a credibility determination regarding the events of 1974, which effectively made the rest of Kahssai’s claim irrelevant, and the invalid basis for his negative credibility determination regarding her fear of persecution, should have caused the BIA to refrain from deferring to his findings and, instead, to make its own independent determination. In that regard, I note that there is no contradictory evidence in the record to undermine Kahssai’s claim, nor is there “ ‘any inherent improbability [or inconsistency] in [Kahssai’s] testimony1 itself.” Id. (quoting White Glove Building Maintenance v. Brennan, 518 F.2d 1271 , 1274 (9th Cir.1975)).

II.

The BIA also contends that Kahssai has not established her statutory eligibility for asylum because she has not shown that she, herself, suffered persecution in the past, only that members of her family may have been political victims. Despite the deaths of her father and brother, and the detention and disappearance of her mother, the BIA dismisses Kahssai’s claim partially on the ground that Kahssai herself “was never detained, interrogated, convicted and sentenced, or imprisoned” in Ethiopia. Here, the-BIA’s narrow focus is inconsistent with the demonstrated practices of the Ethiopian authorities, as well as with the dictates of our case law.

Ethiopian officials suspected only Kahss-ai’s father of anti-government activities, yet they killed Kahssai’s oldest brother and detained and interrogated her mother. As Kahssai explained at her deportation hearing, “in Ethiopia ... if one family member is in trouble ... the rest of the family is in trouble.” Moreover, the fact that Kahssai was not physically abused prior to 1980, when she left Ethiopia, does not mean that her present fear of physical persecution lacks an objective basis. It is not necessary for an intended victim of a violent or savage regime to await the infliction of actual physical injury before fleeing. Given that Kahssai was nine years old in 1980, she might have been young enough not to be a threat; now, at age twenty-two, she might well have “reached an age that renders her suspect.” See Ramirez Rivas v. INS, 899 F.2d 864, 870 (9th Cir.1990) (reversing BIA denial of asylum to El Salvadorian woman who had never been physically threatened, emphasizing that while in El Salvador the woman was young teenager, but now young adult), vacated on other grounds, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 858 , 116 L.Ed.2d 766 (1992).

In Ramirez Rivas , this court found that the past persecution of family members supported the asylum claim of a daughter in the family, even though the daughter was a political neutral and had never been persecuted herself. Similarly, in Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 515 (9th Cir.1985), we emphasized the relevance of violence directed against an alien’s family members, finding that “[t]he fact that there have been a number of threats or acts of violence against members of an alien’s family is sufficient to support the conclusion that the alien’s life or freedom is endangered.” See also Rodriguez v. INS, 841 F.2d 865, 870-71 (9th Cir.1987); Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621, 627 (1st Cir.1985) (“evidence about treatment of [the alien’s] family is probative of [a specific threat to the alien]”); U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, ¶ 43 at 13 (threat of persecution “need not be based on the applicant’s own personal experience. ... [Evidence concerning relatives] may well show that his fear ... of persecution is well founded.”). These authorities are *329 concerned with violence against family members because past experience has shown that what occurred to Kahssai’s family is not unique or even rare: government suspicion of one family member is easily generalized into suspicion, and persecution, of the rest. Thus Kahssai could certainly have a legitimate fear of future persecution whether or not she had herself been subjected to direct physical abuse in the past.

III.

The BIA ruled that if Kahssai suffered past persecution, it did not rise to a level of severity sufficient to warrant a “humanitarian” grant of asylum, as asylum based solely on past persecution has been termed. In making this determination, the BIA looked to the circumstances described in Matter of Chen, Int.Dec. 3104 (BIA 1989), stating that asylum might be granted Kahssai if she demonstrated that her “past persecution had been so severe that return to the country of persecution would be inhumane.”

The alien in Chen was a Chinese Christian who was variously beaten, harassed, and deprived of food and medical attention from the age of eight. The abuse described in Chen was exceptionally inhumane, and granting asylum solely on the basis of past persecution was clearly appropriate in those circumstances. However, the fact that Chen is a sound example of asylum based on past persecution does not mean that it established the applicable standard for evaluating all such asylum claims. In fact, the BIA’s narrow focus on the atrocities described in Chen is in disregard of this court’s decision in Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723 (9th Cir.1988). It was in Desir that we originally ruled that “past persecution, without more, satisfies the [requirements of the asylum statute], even independent of establishing a well-founded fear of future persecution.” Id. at 729 . 6 The Haitian petitioner found eligible for asylum in Desir had suffered “beatings, imprisonment, and assaults by government security forces for the purpose of extortion.” Id. at 724 . The abuse suffered by the alien in Desir did not, however, rise to the level of that later described in the BIA’s decision in Chen.

On remand, the BIA should look to Desir for the relevant comparison in evaluating Kahssai’s claim of past persecution. In doing so, the BIA should not, of course, require identical forms of abuse, but instead should look for comparable severity. Here, Kahssai was stripped of her identity in 1974. She lost her family and her religion. The fact that she did not suffer physical harm is not determinative of her claim of persecution: there are other equally serious forms of injury that result from persecution. For example, when a young girl loses her father, mother and brother — sees her family effectively destroyed — she plainly suffers severe emotional and developmental injury. Cf. Henley, Dutch Jews See Lasting Horror for Yugoslav Child Victims, Reuter Library Report, Aug. 25,1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library. To take her from her remaining family members in the U.S. and force her to return to the place where her family was persecuted might only compound that injury. Under these circumstances, Desir might well direct the grant of asylum based on past persecution.

Conclusion

In affirming the IJ’s denial of Kahssai’s asylum and withholding of deportation application, the BIA: (1) took administrative notice of political changes in Ethiopia without warning Kahssai that notice would be taken, (2) deferred to the IJ’s unsupported adverse credibility determination, (3) incorrectly required Kahssai to show actual childhood physical persecution, and (4) applied an overly stringent standard in evaluating Kahssai’s eligibility for asylum based on past persecution. Our remand to the BIA will allow it to *330 reassess its determination of these issues in evaluating Kahssaf s entitlement to withholding of deportation and eligibility for asylum.

. My discussion will focus on the IJ's evaluation of Kahssai's credibility in light of the BIA's explicit deference to the IJ on this point. See Yepes-Prado v. INS, 10 F.3d 1363, 1366-67 (1993). Normally, however, when the BIA engages in ie novo review of the IJ's factual determinations, we consider only the BIA decision because any errors made by the IJ will be rendered harmless. See Elnager v. INS, 930 F.2d 784, 787 (9th Cir.1991).

. The situation here differs from that of past cases that we have remanded to the BIA for credibility findings after the BIA had declined to make such findings because it rejected the alien’s claim even assuming the facts as true. See, e.g., Garcia-Ramos v. INS, 775 F.2d 1370, 1372, 1375 (9th Cir.1985); Argueta v. INS, 759 F.2d 1395 , 1398 n. 4 (9th Cir.1985). In each of those cases, the IJ had made the necessary credibility findings, but the BIA had not found it necessaiy to adopt them.

. Consider, for example, this interchange:

. The IJ's refusal to evaluate Kahssai’s testimony regarding these events may be due to a mistake on his part. In explaining his refusal, he says that Kahssai did not discover her true relationship to her uncle until 1988, and only at that point did she learn about the events of 1974. But Kahssai did not say this: she simply said that, in order to protect her, her uncle told others that she was his daughter.

Thus, the IJ might have believed that it would be difficult for him to recognize whether Kahssai was honestly describing events that she herself had only recently discovered.

. The IJ and INS counsel demonstrate an apparent fixation on eyewitness testimony that would severely hamper many asylum claims. Consider the following exchange:

Of course, eyewitness testimony is most reliable. Few repressive governments, however, are so unconcerned with human rights standards that they openly flaunt their political persecution, inviting eyewitnesses to executions and producing bullet-ridden bodies for public display. The narrow conception of personal knowledge that the IJ would impose on asylum proceedings would, for example, have barred family members of "disappeared” people in Argentina from describing the deaths of their relatives as part of their asylum claims.

. Desir is the only Ninth Circuit case in which an alien's eligibility for asylum has been based solely on past persecution. Two later cases discussing the issue have, however, looked to Chen for guidance. See Acewicz v. INS, 984 F.2d 1056, 1062 (9th Cir.1993); Castillo-Villagra, 972 F.2d at 1031; cf. Castillo v. INS, 951 F.2d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir.1991) (noting that BIA denied asylum based on past persecution after comparison with Chen); Berroteran-Melendez v. INS, 955 F.2d 1251 , 1255 n. 3 (9th Cir.1992) (only other Ninth Circuit case discussing past persecution, citing Desir).