Pepito Mabalot Almero Quirico David Eustaquio Santa Cruz Nemesio Evangelista Marasigan v. Immigration and Naturalization Service

18 F.3d 757 Pepito Mabalot ALMERO; Quirico David; Eustaquio Santa Cruz; Nemesio Evangelista Marasigan, Petitioners-Appellees, v. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent-Appellant. No. 92-56425. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted Dec. 10, 1993. Decided March 9, 1994. Marshall Tamor Golding, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for the respondent-appellant. Philip D. Abramowitz, Korenberg, Abramowitz & Feldun, Encino, California, for the petitioners-appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Before: FLETCHER, PREGERSON, and RYMER, Circuit Judges. PREGERSON, Circuit Judge: I. INTRODUCTION 1 This case requires us to interpret Sec. 405 of the Immigration Act of 1990, Public Law 101-649 ("IMMACT"), enacted by Congress to extend eligibility for United States citizenship to Filipino veterans of World War II. Cong.Rec. S17111 (1977) (statement of Sen. Simon). The Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") contends that under Sec. 405 of IMMACT the Filipino veterans must prove their military service by a certificate from the United…

I. INTRODUCTION

This case requires us to interpret § 405 of the Immigration Act of 1990, Public Law 101-649 (“IMMACT”), enacted by Congress to extend eligibility for United States citizenship to Filipino veterans of World War II. Cong.Rec. S17111 (1977) (statement of Sen. Simon). The Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) contends that under § 405 of IMMACT the Filipino veterans must prove their military service by a certificate from the United States Army. The veterans argue, and the district court agreed, that such a certificate is not the sole means under § 405 to prove qualifying military service. We affirm.

II. BACKGROUND

During World War II, Congress relaxed the statutory naturalization requirements for non-citizens who fought against the Axis powers. Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1137 , as amended by Act of March 27, 1942, 56 Stat. 182 (“1942 Act”). Among the promised beneficiaries of the 1942 Act were Filipino soldiers who had been called into U.S. military service the year before by President Roosevelt. Military Order of July 26, 1941; Cong.Rec. H28554 (1989) (Statement of Rep. Morrison in support of precursor to IM-MACT § 405).

Section 702 of the 1942 Act…

dissenting:

It’s hard to figure why the INS didn’t leave well enough alone in this case. However, it didn’t, and we must decide not how we would like Almero’s appeal to come out, but how the statutes in place require it to. Applying the standard of review we are obliged to apply, Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 , 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782 , 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), I have to conclude that it is not unreasonable for the INS to require that service in the military forces of the United States (which includes someone who was in the Philippine Army, the Philippine Scouts, or a recognized guerrilla unit), be proved by a “duly authenticated certification from the executive department under which” he served, and that the relevant “executive department” is an executive department of the United States government as defined in the United States Code. 5 *764 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). I therefore dissent from the majority’s conclusion that “duly authenticated certification” can come from a federal district court based on “duly authenticated Philippine documents, including Philippine government records,” Maj. op. at 761-62 (emphasis omitted), or “any authentic Philippine…